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OPINIONS OF THE COURT 
State v, Tolman, Harman, Case No. 870407-CA, was filed 
April 27, 1989, and later published at 107 Utah Adv. Rep. 61; 
P.2d (Utah 1989). 
The companion case, State v. Harman, Tolman, Case No. 
870290-CA, decided January 10, 1989; 99 Utah Adv. Rep. 61; 
P.2d (Utah 1989), preceded it. 
JURISDICTION 
Petitioner seeks certiorari pursuant to Rules 42 and 
43(a)(b)(c) and (d), Rules of the Utah Supreme Court, for review 
of the decision of the Court of Appeals entered April 27, 1989. 
A timely filed Petition for Rehearing was denied by the 
Court of Appeals by Order entered May 22, 1989. Extensions of 
time to file this Petition were granted until July 21 and July 
28, 1989. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In May, 1983, a fire destroyed a building in Murray, 
Utah, which housed both private and Salt Lake County government 
offices. Dean C. Larsen, Assistant Murray Fire Chief, inves-
tigated and concluded that the fire originated in a county office 
owing to misuse of a space heater. Ralph Tolman, (Petitioner), 
was assigned by his boss, Don Harman, Chief Salt Lake County 
Investigator, to also investigate the fire's cause and origin. 
Tolman did so and orally reported his agreement with Larsen's 
opinions. Immediately thereafter, Tolman was relieved of the 
investigation and the county hired an independent private fire 
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investigator, Jim Ashby, in his stead. On June 6, 1983, Ashby 
reported that his investigation resulted in a different conclu-
sion; i.e., that the fire did not originate in county space nor 
was it caused by the space heater. State v. Tolman, 107 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 61, 62, (para 2), April 27, 1989 CA. 
On August 1, 1983, Tolman submitted his seven page 
report per his original opinion and provided a courtesy copy of 
the report to Larsen, contrary to office policy. Tolman's 
supervisor rejected the report as did Harman, (after Tolman 
refused to accept the other's rejection), who also ordered Tolman 
to prepare a second report without any conclusions or opinions. 
Fearing that his employment would be jeopardized if Harman 
learned of the courtesy copy to Larsen, Tolman contacted Larsen 
and told him about Harman's anger over the contents of his report 
and of his tenuous job security and further asked him to conceal 
the report so as to ensure Harman would not find out about it. 
(107 Utah Adv. Rep. at 62, paragraph three.) 
Tolman did; however, advise Larsen that they both 
should tell the truth about the report and it's contents, other 
then to Harman, (if Harman did take an action). (Addendum K). 
After vociferous objections to Harman's rejecting his 
report, Tolman, on August 25, 1983, submitted a one-page "report" 
which said virtually nothing of import and contained no opinions. 
Harman approved and filed that report. (At 62, paragraph 3). 
The private tenants of the demised office building 
brought a civil action against the county in 1984. Larsen was 
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deposed by plaintiffs1 counsel in November, 1984, but failed to 
produce the seven-page Tolman report because he wanted to keep 
Tolman out of trouble with Harman. He did so without asking 
Tolman or ever having spoken to him about the report since the 
15-month-old discussion, (Id.f at 62, para. 4.; Addendum C). 
In 1986, a grand jury was called to investigate a range 
of potential criminality involving public officials; this case 
among them. The "targets" were subpoenaed to testify with 
accompanying written notices advising them of the specific nature 
of potential charges. Tolman, however, was among the group of 
persons receiving "mere" witness subpoenas. He appeared to 
testify on April 9, 1986, and was met outside the jury room by 
special prosecutors Rodney Snow and Larry Keller and their 
investigator, Lorin Brooks. He was then advised of his "target" 
status but only with a generic reference to evidence tampering 
involving the fire investigation. He was afforded an opportunity 
to speak with an attorney but advised that his lawyer could not 
be present inside the jury room with him. (All other targets and 
witnesses were allowed to have inside counsel.) The record 
reflects no advisory of his privilege against self-incrimination. 
Tolman at first expressed a desire to leave but opted to stay and 
testify when advised that counsel would have to remain outside, 
anyway. He testified a second time to the same matters at a 
later date. (Paragraph 4 at 62, summary). 
On October 9, 1986, Tolman was indicted for witness 
tampering, evidence tampering, official misconduct and 
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conspiracy. He filed a number of pre-trial motions. Those 
denied which are pertinent hereto were motions seeking a prelimi-
nary hearing and a Bill of Particulars. (Id.) 
Following a three week trial, Tolman's motion to 
dismiss the evidence tampering charge was granted. The jury was 
allowed to take Tolman's grand jury testimony into deliberation. 
The jury voted to acquit both Defendants (Tollman and Harman) of 
conspiracy; however, Tolman was convicted of felony witness 
tampering and official misconduct, a misdemeanor. The felony was 
reduced to a misdemeanor at sentencing. (Id.) 
On appeal, the official misconduct conviction was 
reversed, (insufficient evidence), but the conviction for tamper-
ing with a witness was affirmed. (Id.) (Harman's conviction was 
reversed dji toto.) 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The following questions are raised owing to Petition-
er's assignment of error to the Court of Appeals panel's 
affirmance of the verdict and decisions in trial court: 
1. Does the "right to appeal" include the right to a 
written, responsive opinion on all issues properly raised? 
2. Were Petitioner's statutory and fundamental consti-
tutional rights violated before the grand jury and did the 
panel's affirmance conflict with the decisions of this Court? 
3. Can the state constitutional provision regarding 
preliminary hearing rights be "amended" by mere legislation? 
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4. Was the denial of a Bill of Particulars in direct 
conflict with the holding of this Court in State v. Bell, infra? 
5. Is the Tampering With a Witness statute unconstitu-
tionally vague and/or overbroad? 
6. Does a verdict obtained from group prayer and 
obeyance to the authority of the Mormon priesthood as conduit of 
the pre-agreed dispositive revelation run afoul of the "chance" 
or "outside influence" exceptions to non-impeachability? 
7. Did prosecutor misconduct prevent a fair trial? 
8. Was the evidence of Petitioner's guilt clearly 
insufficient and was the panel's affirmance thereof in conflict 
with the same panel's decision in the companion case? 
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS REVIEW OF PETITIONER'S 
CLAIMS WAS SO INCOMPLETE AS TO DEPRIVE HIM OF 
HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS ON APPEAL 
Appellant's Brief(s) below carefully addressed eleven 
substantive issues, any one of which, could require reversal. 
The panel below ruled on only four of Appellant's 
substantive claims of error. 
The Court of Appeals has simply ignored the very 
crucial issues this case raises by labeling them "without merit," 
(without explanation). This type of "opinion" renders Petition-
er's "right to appeal in all cases" an empty guarantee. Article 
I, Section 12, Constitution of Utah. 
Rule 30, Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals, requires 
the majority opinion in a criminal case "shall" be in writing. 
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Both courts1 rules (at Rule 9), admonish appellant's 
counsel that a docketing statement which lists the basis for 
appeal as, "the judgment of the trial court is not supported by 
the law or the facts," is unacceptable. It should be equally 
unacceptable for the written opinion on appeal to be nothing more 
than, "no merit." How else can the aggrieved be assured that the 
review of his claims was conscientious and thoughtful, as due 
process requires. (In accord People v. Rojas, 118 Cal. App. 278 
(1981); Ex Parte Griffiths, 118 Ind. 83 (1981). 
II. THE APPEALS COURT ERRED: PETITIONER'S GRAND 
JURY TESTIMONY WAS OBTAINED AND ADMITTED UNCONSTITUTIONALLY 
At trial and on appeal, Tolman argued that his grand 
jury testimony should not have been admitted due to the state's 
noncompliance with the Utah Code and constitutional rights 
respecting notice, counsel and silence of an accused. 
The Court of Appeals, in the instant case, (107 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 61, 64), recites Utah Code Ann. §77-11-3, which 
states, inter alia, that a grand jury "target" shall be advised 
with particularity, of his target status, his right to the 
presence of counsel and his privilege against self incrimination. 
By finding no merit in this argument the panel ignored 
evidence which clearly brings this case within the ambit of State 
v. Ruggeri, 429 P.2d 969 (Utah 1967), deciding apposite thereto. 
Tolman claims plain error and relies again on the pleadings 
submitted at trial. (R. 188-191, 200-205; Addendum H.) 
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Witness Brooks1 (grand jury investigator) notes indi-
cate that upon being informed of his subject status, Tolman "was 
prepared to testify as a witness not knowing he was being looked 
at as a subject". (R. 238.) Brooks' testimony recalled that as 
soon as Tolman was informed of his subject status, he stated, 
"Color me gone". (R. 537, T. 1027.) Brooks testified that 
Tolman was not given a complete Miranda warning outside the grand 
jury room. (R. 537, T. 1026.) Nor do his notes reflect that 
Tolman was ever informed outside the grand jury room of the 
specific nature of the prospective charges. (R. 238-240.) 
Once before the grand jury, Tolman was told by the 
prosecutor that his right to counsel meant counsel could not be 
present with him in the jury room. When asked if he had con-
ferred with counsel, he replied he had not since being informed 
of his "subject" status. (R. 244, 1. 18-23.) The nature of the 
investigation into tampering with evidence was mentioned, but 
never was it clearly stated that Tolman was the "subject" of any 
specific charges. (R. 245, 1. 2-15.) 
A "subject" is an "accused" and he must be fully 
advised of all of his rights in light of the potential charges 
against him. Ruggeri, at 969. The Ruggeri court makes two 
observations absolutely pertinent hereto. The first says: 
(quoting People v. Tomasello, 48 Misc. 2d 156, 265 N.Y.S.2d 686), 
[i]f a possible defendant or target of an 
investigation is subpoenaed before a grand 
jury and there testifies, whether or not he 
claims or asserts his privilege against self 
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incrimination, his constitutional privilege 
is deemed violated. Id. at 690. 
This statement indicates that the violation commences upon the 
issuance of a subpoena to appear without notice of "subject" 
status. That Tolman was informed, however inadequately, of that 
status moments prior to his appearance does not cure the defect. 
Nor does Brooks ever say Tolman remained voluntarily. "Color me 
gone," evidences, however colloquially, a desire to vacate the 
premises. The special prosecutors' admonitions inside the grand 
jury room ring hollow when they are closely scrutinized. 
The second and equally compelling observation made by 
the Ruggeri court has to do with waiver. It states: 
It would seem that a witness who is unaware 
that he is a target of a grand jury inves-
tigation could not intelligently determine 
whether or not he needed counsel unless he 
was fully advised of the charges being 
considered against him; and until he has a 
full knowledge regarding that matter, he will 
not know when to assert his constitutional 
claim of privilege against self-
incrimination. It would be difficult to 
believe that he could intelligently waive the 
right to counsel under such circumstances." 
[Emphasis added.] 429 P.2d at 975. 
The apparently universal standard for waiver of a 
fundamental constitutional right is "knowing and intelligent". 
Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 
(1969); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 92 S.Ct. 2006, 32 
L.Ed.2d 530 (1972). This pertains both to the knowledge and 
understanding of the actual rights involved and how they inter-
face with the nature of the charge. In this Court it means "real 
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notice of the true nature of the charge against himf the first 
and most universally recognized requirement of due process". 
State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309 at 1312 (1987). It would have 
been impossible for Tolman to make a knowing and intelligent 
waiver of his rights since the "real11 nature of the charges was 
never explained to him. To infer from the brief record of the 
grand jury appearance what was meant by the cursory admonition is 
to engage in the kind of speculation which Gibbons proscribes. 
The error of the court in allowing segments of Tolmanfs grand 
jury testimony to be read into the record during the State's case 
in chief, was plain error of constitutional magnitude, which, 
when read in light of the whole record, cannot be said to be 
harmless. State v. Turner, 736 P.2d 1043 (Utah App. 1987). 
The Tolman opinion also should have considered consti-
tutional principles of due process and equal protection but it 
ignores the fact that of all the grand jury targets, Tolman was 
the only one who was not given advance written notice of his 
status; the only one who was not told of the specific nature of 
the charges; the only one who was advised that his attorney would 
have to wait outside the grand jury room; and, was in fact the 
only witness whose attorney was not allowed in the room. 
Neither can one waive the right to counsel when he is 
expressly misled as to what it is. It is pure speculation to 
assume he would have waived the right if properly explained. 
Further, the panel completely failed to recognize the 
privilege against self incrimination. It is not the same as the 
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Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Nowhere does the record show 
that Tolman waived the right to silence. Nor could he know what 
to be silent about without knowing the nature of the charges. 
III. DENIAL OF A PRELIMINARY HEARING 
VIOLATES THE CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
The trial court erred in denying Petitioner's request 
for a preliminary hearing, as did the Court of Appeals in affirm-
ing. Article I, Section 13 of the Utah Constitution provides: 
Offenses heretofore required to be prosecuted 
by indictment, shall be prosecuted by infor-
mation after examination and commitment by a 
magistrate, unless the examination be waived 
by the accused with the consent of the State, 
or by indictment, with or without such 
examination and commitment. (Emphasis 
added.) 
Although the constitution provides that following 
indictment a preliminary hearing is optional, Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure, Rule 7(c), states that a preliminary ex-
amination shall not be held if the defendant is indicted. 
The Court rejected Petitioner's argument on this point, 
asserting the presumption of constitutionality of a statute doc-
trine, requiring a statute be found to "clearly violate some 
constitutional provision. Tolman at 64. (Citations omitted.) 
The Tolman panel reasons that since Article I, Section 
13 does not require a hearing, the legislature has the power to 
prohibit such hearings. (Id.) 
How can it not be a conflict for the constitution to 
say the hearing may be held and the statute to say it may not be? 
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Rule 7(c) is a constitutional amendment which renders the consti-
tutional provision completely emasculated. 
Article XXIII of the constitution, however, prohibits 
any amendments by customary legislative enactment and prescribes 
a lengthy process which includes a referendum. 
Where other discovery processes were also denied, this 
issue is even more critical, especially where objectionable 
hearsay was freely admitted on the conspiracy charge. 
IV. DENIAL OF THE PRE-TRIAL MOTION FOR 
A BILL OF PARTICULARS IS CLEAR ERROR 
Tolman filed a Rule 4(e), Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, motion and memorandum for a Bill of Particulars to 
seek information about the nature and cause of the charges 
against him owing to the broad and ambiguous charging language in 
the Indictment and sought information not contained in the 
indictment, which later proved proximate to Tolman1s convictions. 
(R. 64-67, 89-90, 275-276; Addendum I). He argued below that to 
rule adversely would deny him information sufficient to prepare 
his defense. State v. Jameson, 103 U. 129, 134 P.2d 173 (1943); 
State v. Strand, (on remand) 720 P.2d 425 (1986). See State v. 
Solomon, 93 U. 70, 71 P.2d 104 (1937). 
By failing to grant a Bill of Particulars the trial 
court wrongly failed to limit or circumscribe the area, field or 
transaction as to which the special prosecutors were allowed to 
offer "evidence." See State v. Spencer, 101 U. 287, 121 P.2d 912 
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(1942), overruled on other grounds, 4 U.2d 404, 295 P.2d 345 
(1956). 
Only a month before oral argument in the Court of 
Appeals, this Court decided State v. Bell, 92 Utah Adv. Rep. 22 
(S.Ct., September 30, 1988), the dispositive authority on point. 
In Bell the prosecution did not provide information called for in 
a Bill of Particulars. 
The Bell decision placed heavy burdens on the state's 
justifying opposition to a Bill of Particulars and narrow limits 
on a trial courtfs discretion to deny the motion. The trial 
judge in Tolman made no findings to support his denial, nor did 
the prosecution even come close to meeting the Bell test. 
Bell is in direct conflict with the order of Judge Uno 
and the summary affirmance of the panel. It is a mystery why so 
clear a case, directly on point, could be ignored. 
V. 76-8-508(1)(b) IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL 
Tolman*s conviction on Count IV, "Tampering With a 
Witness," was predicated upon conduct which is not clearly 
proscribed by §76-8-508(1)(b). The law fails to adequately 
inform what JL£ prohibited. Even if the law is constitutional, 
the court nevertheless erred in failing to instruct the jury that 
acts toward withholding of evidence must be intended to cause it 
to be withheld from the official proceeding he believes is 
pending. 
A. The Statute is Void for Vagueness and Overbreadth. 
Tolman was convicted of violating 76-8-508(1)(b): 
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A person is guilty of a felony in the third 
degree if: 
(1) Believing that an official proceeding or 
investigation is pending or about to be 
instituted, he attempts to induce or other-
wise cause a person to: 
* * * 
(b) Withhold any testimony, information, 
document or thing; . . • 
That portion of the statute is unconstitutionally vague 
and overly broad. Subpart (b) mandates what may not be withheld 
but not the "what" it cannot be withheld from. Presumably, the 
legislature meant "withheld" from the "official proceeding 
believed to be pending or about to be instituted." The absence 
of some clear nexus between subpart (b) and subsection (1) makes 
it a crime to have a belief coupled with an unrelated act. 
One could violate the statute by believing that an 
Immigrations hearing was occurring in Seattle while hiding from 
his wife his affair with their neighbor in Tooele. 
The undisputed evidence herein shows that Tolman asked 
Larsen to withhold not the report, but to withhold from Harman 
the fact that Tolman had him given the report; not to keep it 
from Ashby's investigation or the civil suit (without a Bill of 
Particulars, one can only guess which one), but only from Harman, 
/2 
so he wouldn't get in trouble for violating office policy. 
No nexus of intent and official proceeding exists. 
The statute is so plainly unconstitutional that the 
court's failure to address the issue is clear error. State v. 
Laird, 601 P.2d 926, 927, n.6 (1979); see Page v. United States, 
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282 F.2d 807 (8th Cir. 1960). At trial, Tolman objected to the 
statute-based instruction, claiming it created an offense out of 
a mere belief coupled with an unrelated act. (R. 532, T. 1428.) 
It is inexplicable that the panel summarily rejected 
the constitutionality issue which is so crucial that it may be 
raised at any time, remotely so, or even sua sponte. (Laird, 
supra); (State v. Fritt, 463 P.2d 806 (Utah 1970)). The test is, 
"if the person's liberty is at stake." State v. Breckenridge, 
688 P.2d 440 (1983); In Re Woodward, 14 Utah 2d 336, 384 P.2d 110 
(1963). State v. Cook, 714 P.2d 296, 297 (1986); State v. Schad, 
supra; State v. Smith, 16 Utah 2d 374, 401 P.2d 445 (1965). 
State v. Carlsen, 638 P.2d 512 (Utah 1981), held that, 
"[I]n order to find a statute unconstitutionally vague, this 
court must determine that it 'failed to inform an ordinary 
citizen who is seeking to obey the laws as to the conduct sought 
to be prescribed.1" Ld. at 515, citing State v. Bradshaw, 541 
P.2d 800, 802 (Utah 1975)./3 
An ordinary citizen, reading the subject statute, would 
be unclear as to what the word, "thing," meant and certainly 
could not determine what act relates to what proceeding. "There 
is no doubt that a statute that affects fundamental liberties is 
unconstitutional if it is so vague that persons of common intel-
ligence must necessarily guess at its meaning." State v. 
Lindquist, 674 P.2d 1234, 1236 (Utah 1983); In Re Boyer, 636 P.2d 
1085, 1088 (Utah 1971); State v. Packard, 250 P.2d 561, 563 (Utah 
1952). "When a state action impinges on fundamental rights, due 
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process recn ;•=, ^ .andards whir p-ir1' iefi * l 
iiuhi; ~n Re OJD r.^n a: ]'•« - o. ne ir ,-.ei :~'<^es 
Supreme Cniiv -- ^ o r i ' 
.j established that a law fails to meet 
-,,- requirements of the Due Process clause if 
i t is so vague and standardless that it 
] • = a ves the public uncertain as to the conduct . 
i t prohibits or leaves judges and jurors free 
to decide, without any legally fixed stan-
dards, what is prohibited and what :i s not in 
each p a rt ic i 1 ] a r c a s e 
It cannot be gainsaid that §76-8-508(1) (<T sever;? !r-
marriage between the mens rea (knowledge or belief) ana cue 
:
 !
 :: i :t :ii ict pi oscr ibed. 
B The Court Erred by Giving Instruction Number 39 in 
F3^ ? r of Tolm a n' s Offered I^ is t r u ct I cxi I • 
Even if the statute in question passes constitutional 
muster, i t was error to f a I ] to instruct the jury t ^ t- -He 
ing. See State v. Tin: ne r, 736 P.2d ] 043 (Utah App. 1987) 4 In 
Turner, this Court stated that improper I nstri ictions were used 
w h i c h ' " ' i :»1 a t e d u e p rocess bee a u s e t h e y i e 1 a t e t o t h e . s s u e n f 
qui J t and relieve the State of I ts burden of proof.,"1 : : an 
104 5 hs i i i T u r n e r ,  11 :t, =;f i :i i i:t i :>i i :i Ii im 1: = • i : 39 ab, = o] ^  ?e • i : 
c u t i o n '" s b u r d e n w i t h o u t i eq u i r i i i g pr oo f t h a t t h e a 1 . cg e u r.. . 
were re1ated to a part icu1ar proceed ing and done with the belief 
i, ]:: a i: I::! • ::  I i J a r p r c c e e d :!i i I g w o i 11 d b e a £ f e c t e ::i, 
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VI. BOTH COURTS BELOW ERRED ON THE 
ISSUES RE: "GOD" AND THE JURY 
The only facts on the jury prayer issue are those 
contained in the affidavits of juror Karl Anderson. (Addendum 
J-1 and J-2.) But both courts below have overlooked the real 
issues, all of which are compatible with the authority cited in 
the Tolman opinion at page 65: 
Generally, a juror affidavit can only be used 
to impeach a jury verdict when: 1) the 
verdict was determined by chance or bribery, 
Rosenlof v, Sullivan, 676 P.2d 372, 375 (Utah 
1983); Hillier v. Lamborn, 740 P.2d 300, 304 
(Utah Ct. App. 1987); or 2) when extraneous 
prejudicial information was improperly 
brought to the jury's attention or an outside 
influence was improperly brought to bear upon 
any juror. Utah R. Evid. 606(b); State v. 
DeMille, 756 P.2d 81, 83 (Utah 1988); 
Hillier, 740 P.2d at 304. 
The facts in Tolman are easily distinguished from 
DeMille. It was "the priesthood" not prayer or God which pur-
ports to usurp the court's authority. 
The Tolman jury, however, violated both Rule 606(b) 
exceptions, first by agreeing iji advance to vote however the 
prayerleader said God answered his prospective prayer. In 
violation of their oaths, they submitted the verdict to one 
juror's non-evidentiary "revelation". Unlike the juror in 
DeMille, there was no need for post-prayer persuasion since those 
who acquiesced to the authority of the priesthood did so in 
advance. That is as much based upon "chance" as a coin flip. 
The second issue is more disturbing. Despite the 
decisions of the courts below; despite media reports; despite 
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DeMille comparI s o n s ; and d e s p 1 1 e t:he t h i i :i ii ::e such an argument 
s u g g e s t s , t h e ' " G o d ' i s s u e I s i: 1 < :: • ii a b o u t t h e e x I s t e n c e o £ G o d o r 
about prayer or inspiration or reve1ation The facts are that 
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Mormons. 
Toxiitarr - *i* r\- MibmitLe - • + r 
muc1 <rp nnA wn >., hr, * Q u i j a Board , as s u g g e s t e d i n 
t h e DeMil le d i s s e n t . 
n~r : n t ^ r i « r e n c - , i o r s ; r e i i n i o u ' i^iiet' o t 
L u i , a t t h ^ ' p h a n c ^ n ^ n o ^ f < ' 
. . ence , s aup^t-i o n -
a b l e - j o v e r t [ in f luence : - r i e s t h o o d " * • eveh a 
v e r d i c t ± -JH uuL~:dp - ' * — -
> n ^ f . t ^ . - y n Z r
 : w _ a ( i . r o r vu~ i s an 
L *• - D r i e s t n o o d h o l d e r m u n w ei;i r'v-! : P ~s a u t n o r i t a * ^ e 
IN 
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VII. PROSECUTOR P . ^ O N I U C T : SPECIFIC INSTANCES 
AND CUMULATIVELY, PPEJUnir'' " 
Argument • ^r^'r^f - *-~.~. evidence ^r r r ~ - ^ utor 
ri i L a c o n d u c t re deni - n c a m e . - . ^ ,i>-
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The trial record is also replete with the prosecution's 
repeated and intentional attempts to conceal witness testimony, 
block discovery, intimidate witnesses and mislead the jury. (R. 
59, 60, 128-134, 1037-1055, 1160-1219, 1184.) 
Keller even told the jury that Tolman could testify if 
he wanted his side of the story heard. (R. 460, 470, 1205, 
1225.) Tolman's motion for a mistrial was denied by the court. 
The damage required Tolman to take the stand. 
A small sampling of the pertinent case law is: State 
v. Eaton, 569 P.2d 1114 (Utah 1977), comments about the assertion 
of a privilege or non-testimony warrants reversal if any doubt of 
prejudice exists; State v. Jerrell, 808 P.2d 18 (Utah 1980) and 
State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913 (Utah 1987), nondisclosure of 
exculpatory evidence or Rule 16 (discovery) materials reversible 
error. (See also, State v. Bell, supra.) 
Pages 29 to 42 of Appellant's Brief in the Court of 
Appeals fully sets forth the facts and the law on these issues. 
VIII. THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT TO 
SUPPORT A CONVICTION FOR WITNESS TAMPERING 
The undisputed record simply cannot support the con-
viction herein. In fact, one only has to read the entire testi-
mony of Larsen to conclude that the verdict is not supported by 
the evidence. 
The panel's reasoning is so flawed that it seems 
impossible for them to have read Larsenfs testimony. 
1. Official Proceeding: 
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" (A; juror could reasonably conclude Tolman 
believed that an official investigation was 
pe~.ci - r -r. ( Emphas i s added . ) 
Inducement: 
• , • ;.; x . n n . " i M " f p ,ii ' [ ; < ° ) " 1 ' 1 i (. i . i 
repor* 
^tnnold: 
"^r months later) Larsen withheld (the 
ic^ort) from a civil proceeding despite a 
subpoena . . . because he did not want tr 
cause problems for Tolman, f^mphapis added,) 
rp K r> n o n 0 l % r -> "« 4 ^  ^  f- 0 r- *~ ^  p - * n -- • - «_» 3 g a ^ ' ; r , " I I (I 11 I 
Auaj - cf'- "vide? a cr::rir;;l me:,? : ^ a if <u? * nowing]v cr 
! he |i(. . - ^ ^ J : ,ave 
• u' r - . n d u c e m e : * * I <rr s t s n "-1 v : t h i c a *~h^ " e o c : fc - ~ ' m 
. - v e s t i g a t i o n . \ i ' i : « 
- : i '"„. . u a L J. e m e n t a J. i;t.ui J O e II I I HJ VJ J * „ c: c* i ,, » . $ 
" r e c K l e s j r i t e n t : o n a . MOW;* :S->e § 7 6 - 2 - ] 0 : 
i n f e r e n c e ^ .... aw <_ - .. .1 • «v A de! ic \*ner : ic* , 
most of t h e t e s t :i mony i s u n d i s p u t e d . 
T1 :t e • ::: • i 1 J ] • t: e s t :i n: i o i 1 } f i: c • i i t \ * h :ii • : 1: i <= i l :l i :i f e i e i I c < * c £ t a in p e r i n g 
can be d rawn, o f c o u r s e , i s To1man 's and La r sen* s , To1man, of 
c o u r s e , c 1 e a r 1 y p r o v i d e s no bas i s f oJ : si l• :: 1: i ai :t :i i If e i ei ice A < :1 den-
d u m K i s t h e p e r t i n e n t e x t r a c t s f r o m L a r s e n ' ' s t e s t i i n o n y , N :) 
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reasonable juror could have inferred guilt from that testimony, 
Larsen clearly states that Tolman always told him to tell the 
truth but Larsen decided, on his own, to withhold his knowledge 
of the report. If this Court does nothing but read that adden-
dum, this case will be reversed and remanded for entry of acquit-
tal. 
It is undisputed that Tolman actually welcomed the 
disclosure of his investigative findings and only sought to 
destroy one of numerous identical copies of the report for 
reasons totally unrelated to the independent investigation of 
Ashby or the civil suit. He, in fact, is the "whistleblower" who 
brought the whole matter to the media. And what is an official 
proceeding? Certainly not a civil tort action. "Official" 
proceedings are those which are done in the execution of the 
duties of public office, strictly within the statutory jurisdic-
tion of government. (See §76-8-201, et seq.) 
CONCLUSION 
For any one of the foregoing bases a writ should issue. 
DATED this ^ A day of July, 1989. 
JD 
Attorney for Petitioner 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the JJf day of July, 1989, a 
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prepaid fully thereon, to the Utah Attorney General, j236 State 
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ADDENDUM 
FOOTNOTES 
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POkiiuiNib -r .KANSCRIPT OF XKJ.Ab PROCEEDINGS, 
FEBRUARY 25, 1987; STATE V. TOLMAN AND HARMAN, 
CR-86-1522; R. 945 'et seq. (TESIMONY OF C. DEAN 
LARSEN) 
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FILE PETITION FOR WRI. ~1 C^l^w.,. 
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FOOTNOTES 
The importance of the limitless use of "evidence," especially 
the admission of hearsay, without deciding the preliminary 
question of conspiracy is underscored and is necessarily part and 
parcel of this issue. Tolman was acquitted of conspiracy yet the 
abundance of otherwise inadmissible evidence was heard by the 
jury which convicted him of direct offenses. See complete 
argument in Tolman (Appellant's) Brief; Harman (Appellant's) 
Brief (supra); Utah Court of Appeals.) 
? t 
T'he undisputed testimony is that Tolman freely discussed the 
report and his opinions with the independent investigators; that 
Harman and others had copies of the report; that the original was 
kept in Tolman1s regular file; that once the suit commenced the 
county attorneys refused to give up the Tolman report based on a 
work prodi ict theory. 
The Carlsen court cited a statute similar to Utah's which had 
been upheld against constitutional challenges in State v. Stroh, 
91 Wash.2d 580, 588 P.2d 1182 (1979). Stroh construes a statute 
which is drafted ii i a way to foreclose any argument of vagueness 
or overbreadth. In Stroh, the court ruled that the statute need 
not expressly include as an element the intent to obstruct 
justice, since the legislature determined that "attempts to 
influence a witness to change his testimony or to absent himself 
from a trial or other official proceeding, necessarily r- v^  ~~ 
their purpose and it is their natural tendency to obstr^ o'^  
justice" "The intent to perform the acts proscribed by the 
statute, w i t I knowledge or reason to believe that the person is 
or probabl; is about to be called as a witness, conclusively 
shows an intent to obstruct justice". [Emphasis added ] Id 
I 
He1d: Ru1e 1 9 ( c ) , Utah Ru1es of Crimina1 Procedure indicates 
11: i a t error m a y b e assigned t o a i I i n s t r u c t i o n w i t h o r w i t h o u t 
object] on. 
A 
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I) E T E RMINATI V'E AUTHOR!TIES '"' • • " • 
* 'icle Ir Section 12, Utah Constitution, [Rights of accused 
11 i criminal prosecutions the accused shall 
have the right to appear and defend in person • 
and by counsel, to demand the nature and 
cause of the accusation against him, to have 
a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, 
to be confronted by the witnesses against 
him, to have compulsory process to compel the 
attendance of witnesses in his own behalf,, to 
hc ve a speedy public trial by an impar t i a J 
jii iry of the county or district in which the 
: • ffense is alleged to have been committed, 
c ,:i: i' :! the right to appeal in all cases. In no 
:ii i i, = t a nee shall any accused person, before 
f::! i ia] judgment, be compelled to advance money 
or fees to secure the rights herein guaran-
teed. The accused shall not be compelled to 
g :ii F e evidence against himself; a w i f e shall 
i Ic • t be compe1led t o t e s t if y a gain s t her 
husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor 
shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for 
the same offense, 
Article I, Section 13, Utah Constitutioi l, [ Prosecut i o n b y i i: I £ o i 
mation or indictment - Grand jury.]. 
Offenses h e r e t o fore required t o be pros e cut e d 
by indictment, shall be prosecuted by infor-
Lon after examination and commitment by a 
1st-rate, unless the examination be waived 
-;he accused with the consent of the State, 
or by indictment, with or without such 
examination and commitment. The formatioi I of 
the grand jury and the powers and duties 
thereof shall be as prescribed by the Legis-
lature. 
Ar t i d e XXIII, Utah Constitution 
Sect. _._. L Amendments : proposal, electioi I . ] 
1
 amendment or amendments to this Constitu-
i may be proposed in either house of the 
islature, and if two-thirds of all the 
members elected to each of the two houses, 
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shall vote in favor thereof, such proposed 
amendment or amendments shall be entered on 
their respective journals with the yeas and 
nays taken thereon; and the Legislature shall 
cause the same to be published in ab least 
one newspaper in every county of the state, 
where a newspaper is published, for two 
months immediately preceding the next general 
election, at which time the said amendment or 
amendments shall be submitted to the electors 
of the state for their approval or rejection, 
and if a majority of the electors voting 
thereon shall approve the same, such amend-
ment or amendments shall become part of this 
Constitution. 
The revision or amendment of an entire 
article or the addition of a new article to 
this Constitution may be proposed as a single 
amendment and may be submitted to the elec-
tors as a single question or proposition. 
Such amendment may relate to one subject, or 
any number of subjects, and may modify, or 
repeal provisions contained in other articles 
of the Constitution, if such provisions are 
germane to the subject matter of the article 
being revised, amended or being proposed as a 
new article. 
Section 2, [Revision of the Constitution.] 
Whenever two-thirds of the members, elected 
to each branch of the Legislature, shall deem 
it necessary to call a convention to revise 
or amend this Constitution, they shall 
recommend to the electors to vote, at the 
next general election, for or against a 
convention, and, if a majority of all the 
electors, voting at such election, shall vote 
for a convention, the Legislature, at its 
next session, shall provide by law for 
calling the same. The convention shall 
consist of not less than the number of 
members in both branches of the Legislature. 
Section 3, [Submission to electors.] 
No Constitution, or amendments adopted by 
such convention, shall have validity until 
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submitted t o., a i i d a d o p t e d b y , a, i na j o r i t y o f 
the electors of the State voting at the next 
general election. 
Constitution. of _t he United S t a t e s, Amen d m e n t_ VI, [.Rights of 
accused.] 
x. •--• * , w 
shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public 
*- • al, by an impartial iury of the State and 
-rict wherein the crime shall have been 
fitted, which district shall have been 
viously ascertained by law, and to be 
*~- "* of the nature and cause of the 
*>T\% t •> be confronted with the wit-
.?e:= against him; to have compulsory 
- - obtaining witnesses in his favor, 
nave the Assistance of couns< " f*** his 
ense. 
Section 
or willf 
7 0 _ z _ 
ully" 
maliciously"; 
xUJ , uer mitions 
; "knowingly, or 
and "criminal n< 
o f • 
with 
egiig* 
intentionally, 
knowledge"; " 
or with i 
recklessly 
ence or criminally negli 
i itei it. 
9 o r 
gent. 
h • ^yan^ engages i n conduct: 
. tr 11 c J. u 11 a 1 1 y , O I 'w I L I : .i:.. L e n L - r A .. 
Ly with respect to the nature of hie 
c o n d u c• i r a res u 11 o f h i s c o n d i: o t, when 
nis conscious objective or desire : 
* • in the conduct or canpp f-h-> -PS 
' Kn, wiLh knowledge- .. ,i; 
>ect „. ,.„ ... .duct or to circjn..tances 
•oundinq his conduct when he is aware of 
•s conduct or the existing 
A person acts knowingly, ur 
wit tf:th respect to a result of 
onduct when he is aware that h.s conduct 
^sonab1 v~ ;*-^ - j r * -* - * ^  ^  >--»*• 
(3) :*•.-< or maliciously, wi*:h respect 
to circu s surrounding his conduct or 
the resu . is conduct when he is aware of 
but consciously disregards -; r. ibsta-.t ia 1 ;i"jc 
nil istifiable risk that the circumstances 
ex -5t or the result will occur. The risk 
must be of such a nature and degree that its 
disregard constitutes a *:ro--s iev.arion from 
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the standard of care that an ordinary person 
would exercise under all the circumstances as 
viewed from the actor's standpoint. 
(4) With criminal negligence or is criminal-
ly negligent with respect to circumstances 
surrounding his conduct or the result of his 
conduct when he ought to be aware of a 
substantial and unjustifiable risk that the 
circumstances exist or the result will occur. 
The risk must be of such a nature and degree 
that the failure to perceive it constitutes a 
gross deviation from the standard of care 
that an ordinary person would exercise in all 
the circumstances as viewed from the actor's 
standpoint. 
Section 76-8-201, Official misconduct - Unauthorized acts or 
failure of duty. 
A public servant is guilty of a class B 
misdemeanor if, with an intent to benefit 
himself or another or to harm another, he 
knowingly commits an unauthorized act which 
purports to be an act of his office, or 
knowingly refrains from performing a duty 
imposed on him by law or clearly inherent in 
the nature of his office. 
Section 76-8-508, Tampering with witness - Retaliation against 
witness or informant - Bribery. 
A person is guilty of a felony of the third 
degree if: 
(1) Believing that an official proceeding or 
investigation is pending or about to be 
instituted, he attempts to induce or other-
wise cause a person to: 
* * * 
(b) Withhold any testimony, information, 
document, or thing; or . . . 
Section 77-11-3, Evidence receivable - Witness to be advised of 
rights. 
(1) The grand jury shall receive no other 
evidence than is given by witnesses under 
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oath or affirmation, or documentary evidence, 
or the deposition of a witness taken as 
provided by law. The grand jury shall 
r e c e i v e o n 1 y 1 e g a ] e v i d e n c e, 
(2) Any person c a11e d t o t e s t ify before t h e 
grand jury may be advised of his right to be 
represented by counsel. If a witness is or 
becomes a ir.b ject of the investigation, he 
shall be advised />t: t bat fact and of his • • 
right to counsel, and of his privilege 
against self incrimination. On demand of a 
witness for representation by counsel, the 
proceedings shall be delayed until counsel is 
present. In the event that counsel of the 
witness1 choice is not available, he shall be 
required t o o bt a in or a c c e p t o t h e r c o u n s e1. 
Rule 4(e), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
When facts not set out in an inforn tation or 
indictment are required to inform a defendant 
of the nature and cause of the offense 
charged, so as to enable him to prepare his 
defense, the defendant may file a written 
motion for a b i11 o f p art i c u1ars. Th e mot ion 
shall be filed at arraignment or within ten 
days thereafter, <~>r at; such la*;er time as the 
court may permit ue court rr-ay, on its own 
motion, r.ir« • - h- :":Iirig of .- bill of 
particuiarz * A b A U of particulars may !:  e • 
amended or supplemented at anv time subjec t 
to such conditions as justice may require. 
^ e request for and contents of a bill of 
- .ticulars shall be limited • o a statement 
of factual information needed io set forth 
the essential elerv^r^.- r c -"' ~arti cular 
offense charged, 
Ru 1 e 7 (c) , Utah Rules of Cr iini i Ia 1_ Procedure . 
If a defendant is charged with a felony, he 
shall not be called on to plead before the 
committing magistrate. During the initial 
appearance before the magistrate, the defen-
dant shall be advised of hi s r:i ght to a 
preliminary examination. If the defendant 
waives his right to a preliminary ex-
amination, and the prosecuting attorney 
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consents, the magistrate shall forthwith 
order the defendant bound over to answer in 
the district court. If the defendant does 
not waive a preliminary examination, the 
magistrate shall schedule the preliminary 
examination. Such examination shall be held 
within a reasonable time, but in any event 
not later than ten days if the defendant is 
in custody for the offense charged and not 
later than 30 days if he is not in custody; 
provided, however, that these time periods 
may be extended by the magistrate for good 
cause shown. A preliminary examination shall 
not be held if the defendant is indicted. 
Rule 16, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure - Discovery. 
(a) Except as otherwise provided, the 
prosecutor shall disclose to the defense upon 
request the following material or information 
of which he has knowledge: 
(1) Relevant written or recorded statements 
of the defendant or co-defendants; 
(2) The criminal record of the defendant; 
(3) Physical evidence seized from the 
defendant or co-defendant; 
(4) Evidence known to the prosecutor that 
tends to negate the guilt of the accused, 
mitigate the guilt of the defendant, or 
mitigate the degree of the offense for 
reduced punishment; and 
(5) Any other item of evidence which the 
court determines on good cause shown should 
be made available to the defendant in order 
for the defendant to adequately prepare his 
defense. 
(b) The prosecutor shall make all disclo-
sures as soon as practicable following the 
filing of charges and before the defendant is 
required to plead. The prosecutor has a 
continuing duty to make disclosure. 
• * * 
(g) If at any time during the course of the 
proceedings it is brought to the attention of 
the court that a party has failed to comply 
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with this rule, the court may order such 
party to permit the discovery or inspection, 
grant a continuance, or prohibit the party 
from introducing evidence not disclosed, or 
it may enter such other order as it deems 
just under the circumstances. 
Rule 19(c), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
No party may assign as error any portion of 
the charge or omission therefrom unless he 
objects thereto before the jury is instruct-
ed, stating distinctly the matter to which he 
objects and the ground of his objection. 
Notwithstanding a party's failure to object, 
error may be assigned to instructions in 
order to avoid a manifest injustice. 
Rule 606(b), Utah Rules of Evidence. 
Upon an inquiry into the validity of a 
verdict or indictment, a juror may not 
testify as to any matter or statement occur-
ring during the course of the jury's delib-
erations or to the effect of anything upon 
his or any other juror's mind or emotions as 
influencing him to assent to or dissent from 
the verdict or indictment or concerning his 
mental processes in connection therewith, 
except that a juror may testify on the 
question whether extraneous prejudicial 
information was improperly brought to the 
jury's attention or whether any outside 
influence was improperly brought to bear upon 
any juror. Nor may his affidavit or evidence 
of any statement by him concerning a matter 
about which he would be precluded from 
testifying be received for these purposes. 
Rule 9, Rules of the Utah Supreme Court, Docketing statement. 
(c) Content of docketing statement. The 
docketing statement shall contain the 
following information in the order set forth 
below: 
* * * 
(5) The issues presented by the appeal, 
expressed in the terms and circumstances of 
the case, but without unnecessary detail. 
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The questions should not be repetitious. 
General conclusory statements, such as "the 
judgment of the trial court is not supported 
by the law or facts," are not acceptable. 
Rule 9, Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals, Docketing Statement. 
(c) Content of docketing statement. The 
docketing statement shall contain the 
following information in the order set forth 
below: 
* * • 
(5) The issues presented by the appeal, 
expressed in terms and circumstances of the 
case, but without unnecessary detail. The 
questions should not be repetitious. General 
conclusory statements, such as "the judgment 
of the trial court is not supported by the 
law or facts," are not acceptable. 
Rule 30, Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals, Decision of the 
court: Dismissal; notice of decision. 
(c) Decision and opinion in writing; entry 
of decision. When a judgment, decree, or 
order is reversed, modified, or affirmed by 
the court, the reasons therefor shall be 
stated concisely in writing and filed with 
the clerk. Any judge on the panel concurring 
or dissenting therefrom may likewise give the 
reasons in writing and file the same with the 
clerk. The entry by the clerk in the records 
of the court shall constitute the entry of 
the judgment of the court. 
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cause" for refusing an employment referral 
was unreasonable and irrational given the 
Department's rule which includes economic 
factors as a basis for "good cause" and given 
the economic imperatives which plaintiffs 
faced. 
RETIREMENT RULE 
As noted above, the dispositive rule states 
that "[g]ood cause for failure to obtain an 
available job" may also be established by 
showing "the elements which establish good 
cause for quitting a job ...." Utah Admin. R. 
475-5c-7 (1987-88). The rule detailing 
"good cause" for quitting a job expressly 
provides that "P]eaving work solely to accept 
retirement benefits is not a compelling reason 
for quitting." Utah Admin. R. 475-5a-7(9) 
(1987-88). 
However, the latter rule is inapplicable to 
the cases before us. Plaintiffs did not refuse 
the referral to accept retirement benefits. 
Commencement of those benefits was as much 
as two years away. Plaintiffs refused the ref-
erral to preserve the ultimate availability of 
the retirement benefits. The purpose of the 
rule is to avoid "double-dipping," an inter-
pretation supported by other language in the 
rule stating that "[although it may be reaso-
nable for an individual to take advantage of a 
retirement benefit, payment of unemployment 
benefits in such a circumstance would not be 
consistent with the intent of the Unemploy-
ment Insurance program." Id. This language 
clearly contemplates the impropriety of simu-
ltaneous receipt of retirement and unemploy-
ment benefits, a result which is not present in 
this case and is specifically eschewed by plai-
ntiffs. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiffs had good cause to reject the 
Department's referrals to BM&T. Plaintiffs 
were entitled to unemployment compensation 
during the interim period between being laid 
off and, as applicable in individual cases, 
either commencement of their USX retirement 
benefits, commencement of other employment, 
or exhaustion of unemployment benefits in the 
ordinary course. These cases are remanded to 
the Board of Review for calculation and 
award of the unemployment benefits to which 
plaintiffs are entitled. 
Gregory K. Orme, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
Richard C. Davidson, Judge 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
1. This distinction having been made, the Board 
held that plaintiffs were entitled to retain benefits 
they had received up to the time of their respective 
referrals. 
2. As a general proposition, "good cause" in the 
context of unemployment compensation is determ-
ined objectively. Denby v. Board of Review, 567 
— — ITTAW AnVA 
£1 
P.2d 626, 630 (Utah 1977) ("such cause as would 
similarly affect persons of reasonable and normal 
sensitivity"). 
3. Plaintiffs claim there was substantial risk invo-
lved in working for BM&T because BM&T was 
merely a group of five attorneys with very little 
relevant experience. Of course, the success BM&T 
has in fact had cannot be allowed to color our ass-
essment of how the situation would reasonably have 
looked to plaintiffs at the time. 
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OPINION 
GREENWOOD, Judge: 
Ralph Tolman (Tolman) appeals from his 
conviction of tampering with a witness, a class 
A misdemeanor in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. §76-8-508 (1978), and official misc-
onduct, a class B misdemeanor in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. §76-8-201 (1978) . 
Tolman raises numerous issues on appeal, 
including whether: 1) the evidence was suffi-
cient to support the convictions; 2) the trial 
court erred in ruling that Tolman was not 
entitled to a preliminary hearing: 3) the trial 
court erred in admitting a transcript of 
Tolman's grand jury testimony at trial; and 4) 
the trial court erred in failing to consider juror 
affidavits concerning one juror's" alleged 
divine revelation. We affirm the conviction of 
witness tampering and reverse the conviction 
of official misconduct. 
I. FACTS 
"In setting out the facts from the record on 
appeal, we resolve all conflicts and doubts in 
favor of the jury's verdict and the rulings of 
*iCT REPORTS 
Tolman 
dv. Rep. 61 
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the trial court." State v. Bab bell, 103 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 14, 14 (March 3, 1989). Our state-
ment of the facts, therefore, is set forth in 
conformance with Babbell. 
In May 1983, a fire at the Fashion Place 
Professional Plaza in Murray, Utah caused 
extensive damage to the offices of the Salt 
Lake County mental health department. Dean 
C. Larsen (tztfGQT), Assistant Chief and Fire 
Marshall for the Murray City Fire Depart-
ment, investigated the fire and reported that it 
originated in the mental health offices and was 
caused by misuse of a space heater and exte-
nsion cord. The next day, Evan Stephens 
(Stephens), risk manager for Salt Lake 
County, asked the county attorney's office to 
investigate the fire. Claude Donald Harman 
(Harman), chief investigator for the county 
attorney's office, assigned Tolman and inve-
stigator Olin Yearby (Yearby) to assist in 
determining the cause and origin of the fire. 
Tolman and Yearby met with Larsen at the 
fire scene and investigated the fire. Afterw-
ards, Tolman informed Stephens that he 
agreed with Larsen that the fire originated in 
the county offices. Stephens, who was conce-
rned about the county's liability for the fire if 
it originated in the county's offices, wrote a 
letter to Harman, stating he was hiring Jim 
Ashby (Ashby) of Global Investigations to 
perform an independent investigation of the 
fire. Shortly thereafter, Tolman and Yearby 
ceased their investigation. In the meantime, a 
laboratory analyzed the extension cord and 
space heater and provided a report which 
stated that the heater could not have caused 
the fire because it was not energized at the 
time of the fire. On June 6, 1983, Ashby 
concluded that based on the laboratory anal-
ysis and his investigation, the fire originated in 
the attic above the county offices. 
On August 1, 1983, Tolman submitted a 
seven-page report on the fire to his superv-
isor, Sam Dawson. The report concluded that 
the fire originated in the mental health depa-
rtment's offices ."^Dawson rejected the report. 
Hi Tolman's insistence, Dawson sent the 
report to Harman. Harman also rejected the 
report and_ordered Tolman to prepare another 
rjeporj^/cpntrary, to tne county attorney^ 
/?ffice policy- of not releasing reports outsii 
r 
lice prior to approval bv a supervisor 
| Tolman sent a copy of the seven-page repqr^  
L to Larsen./The frstimony is confiictyigjggar 
ffether Tolman^ent the rego^ro^arsen 
Je *or after
 (>fatman rejected it. ro any 
fenu/^fter Harman rejected the report, 
Tolman contacted Larsen. told him that 
Harman was angry about the contents of the 
report and asked him to destroy the report. 
Tolman also informed Larsen that he, 
Tolman, could get into trouble for releasing 
the report to Larsen. On August 25, 1983, 
Tolman, submitted a one-page report on the 
fire to Harman, which did not include an 
CODE*co 
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opinion as to the fire's origin. Harman app-
roved and filed the report. 
In 1984, civil litigation regarding the fire 
was initiated. In November 1984, Larsen rec-
eived a subpoena duces tecum requesting him 
to appear at a deposition with all records and 
documents relating to the fire at the Fashion 
Place Professional Plaza. Larsen did not 
produce Tolman's seven-page report at t e 
deposition because he did not want to cause 
Tolman any problems. Larsen was again* 
deposed in November 1985 and revealed the 
existence of TolmanTs seven-'pa^e report. 
In 1986, a grand jury was called lo investi-
gate possible criminal charges related to the 
alleged cover-up of reports regarding the 
1983 fire at the Fashion Place Professional 
Plaza. On|Apnr9T1I?86) Tolman was called to 
testify befoTFTRe^fand jury. Prior to Tolman 
testifying, special prosecutors Rodney Snow 
and Larry Keller, and grand jury investigator 
Lorin C Brooks met Tolman outside the 
grand jury room ajid advised him that he was 
the subject of thejrandjury inquiry. Tolman 
stated that he did not realize he was a subject. 
Snow and Keller then told Tolman that he had 
the right to have counsel present outside_the 
courtroom, that lie could talk to an attorney 
before testifying, and that he could contact an 
attorney at any time during his testimony. 
Tolman said he had an attorney and that he 
was aware of his rights. He also stated he was 
willing to appear, despite the prosecutors' 
oTter to postpone his testimony. Tolman then 
took the witness stand, acknowledged that he 
had a right to counsel, and was informed that 
the investigation concerned the report he pre-
pared regarding the fire at the Fashion Place 
Professional Plaza. About a month later, 
Tolman was again subpoenaed to testify 
before the grand jury and informed of his 
right to.couns.gL. __ 
OnjOctober 9, 1986.Ahe grand jury indicted 
Tolman lor tampering with evidence, tampe-
ring with a witness, official misconduct and 
criminal conspiracy. Prior to trial, Tolman's 
motion for a preliminary hearing was denied. 
After a three week trial, the jury retired to 
deliberate, portions of^  Tolman's £rand iurv 
transcript were permitted to be taken intojhe 
jury room. The jury convicted Tolman of 
tampering with a witness and official misco-
jiduxt. inis appeal followed. " " 
II. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE 
On appeal, Tolman claims the evidence was 
insufficient to support his convictions. When 
reviewing whether evidence is sufficient to 
support a jury conviction, 
we review the evidence and all inf-
erences which may reasonably be 
drawn from it in the light most 
favorable to the verdict of the jury. 
We reverse a jury conviction for 
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insufficient evidence only when the 
evidence, so viewed, jg sufficiently 
inconclusive nr inherently improb-
able that reasonable minds must 
have entertained a reasonable doubt 
that the defendant committed the 
crime of which he was convicted. 
State v. Booker, 709 P.2d 342, 345 (Utah 
1985) (quoting State v. Pctree, 659 P.2d 443, 
444 (1983); State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 479 
(Utah 1988). We will not substitute our judg-
ment for that of the jury as it is the "exclusive 
province of the jury to determine the credibi-
lity of the witnesses and weigh the evidence." 
Steele v. Brienhoh, 747 P.2d 433, 436 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1987); Booker, 709 P.2d at 345. 
A. Witness Tampering 
Our first inquiry is whether the evidence was 
sufficient to support Tolman's conviction of 
tampering with a witness under Utah Code 
Ann. §76-8-508 (1978). Section 76-8-
508 states: 
X^ person is guilty of a felony of the 
third degree if: 
/ j")U) Believing that an official proc-
l/W J eeding or investigation is pending or 
about to be instituted, he attempts 
I to induce or otherwise cause a 
person to: 
(b) Withhold any testimony, infor-
mation, document, or thing.... 
In order to satisfy the elements of section 76-
8-508^ the prosecution had to demonstrate 
that:QTJ) Tolman believed that an official pro-
ceeding or investigation was pending or about 
to be instituted. See, e.g., State v. Bradley, 
752 P.2d 874, 877 (Utah 1988) (stating that 
section 76-8-508 does not require proof that 
an official investigation or proceeding was 
pending, but only that defendant believed such 
an investigation or proceeding was pending); 
and Qp Tolman knowingly or intentionally 
attempted to induce or otherwise cause 
another person to withhold any testimony, 
information, document, or thing. ) 
In this case, Tolman was assigned to inves-
tigate the fire at the Fashion Place Professi-
onal Plaza and met with Yearby and Larsen at 
the scene of the fire to determine its cause. 
Tolman subsequently prepared an investigation 
report. Based on these facts, a juror could 
reasonably conclude Tolman believed that an 
official investigation was pending. In addition, 
Larsen testified that Tolman instructed him to 
destroy the report. Subsequently, Larsen wit-
hheld Tolman*s seven-page report from a 
civil proceeding despite a subpoena duces 
tecum requiring him to produce the report. 
Larsen testified that he did not produce the 
~rt because he did not want to cause pTo-repor 
Clems Pj  tor Tolman. Based on that testimony, 
tne jury could reasonably conclude that 
Tolman induced Larsen to withhold the report 
from an official investigation or proceeding. 
Although contrary evidence was presented, 
w[t|he existence of contradictory evidence or 
conflicting inferences does not warrant distu-
rbing tnVjury's verdict." Id. We, therefore, 
conclude that the record contains sufficient 
evidence from which the jury could conclude 
that Tolman knowingly or intentionally atte-T 
mpted to induce Larsen to withhold the seven- L 
page report from an official investigation or C 
proceeding. Thus, we affirm 'loiman's conv-/ 
iction for witness tampering. 
B. Official Misconduct 
We next consider whether the evidence is 
sufficient to support Tolman's conviction of 
official misconduct. Utah Code Ann. §76-8-
201 (1978) states: 
A public servant is guilty of a class 
B misdemeanor if, with an intent to 
benefit _ himself or anoTheT^of to 
harm anotheTj FTe ITn o w i n g 1 y 
commits an unauthorized act which 
purports to be an act of his office, 
or knowingly refrains from perfor-
ming a duty imposed on him by law 
or clearly innerent in the nature of 
his office. * 
To demonstrate a violation of section 76-8-
201, the proseaition was required to prove 
that Tolman: ( t / acted in his capacity as a 
public servant; @$ acted with an intent to 
benefit himself or another or to harm another; 
and^yknowingly committed an unauthorized 
act which purported to be an act of his office 
or knowingly refrained from performing a 
duty imposed on him by law or clearly inhe-
rent in the nature of his officeJWe can find 
no evidence in the record to establish the third 
element, that Tolman committed an unauth-
prized act which purported to be an act of his 
officejAlthough Tolman may have committed 
an unauthorized act by distributing the seven-
page report to Larsen in violation of office 
policy, there is no evidence that Tolman's act 
purported to be an act of his office. In fact, 
Larsen testified that Tolman told him he 
would be in trouble if Harman knew Larsen 
had received the report. In addition, we find 
no evidence that Tolman Tcnowmgly refrained 
from performing a duty imposed by lay or 
innerent injhe nature ot ms otlice. 1 herefore, 
because we find no evidence in the record to 
satisfy all elements of section 76-8-201, we 
reverse Tolman's conviction for official mis-
conduct. 
III. PRELIMINARY HEARING 
Tolman also claims the trial court erred in 
denying his request for a preliminary hearing. 
Article I, section 13 of the Utah Constitution 
provides: 
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Offenses heretofore required to be 
prosecuted by indictment, shall be 
prosecuted by information after 
examination and commitment by a 
magistrate, unless the examination 
be waived by the accused with the 
consent of the State, or by indict-
ment, with or without such exami-
nation and commitment. 
(Emphasis added). 
Although the constitution provides that 
following indictment anVxamination and 
commitment by a magistrate ys optional, Ijtah 
R. Crim. P. 7{c) states that a preliminary 
examination shall not be held if the defendant 
is indicted. Tolman claims that the statute 
clearly conflicts with the constitution and is, 
therefore, unconstitutional. In order for a 
statute to "Be declared'unconstitutional, a 
statute must "clearly violate some constituti-
onal provision, and further, the violation must 
be clear, complete and unmistakable." Trade 
Comm'n v. Skaggs Drug Centers, Inc., 21 
Utah 2d 431, 446 P.2d 958, 961 (1968); see 
also Zamora v. Draper, 635 P.2d 78, 80 (Utah 
1981). In examining statutory constitutionality, 
the court must apply every reasonable presu-
mption favoring constitutionality, acknowle-
dging the legislative prerogative to enact laws. 
Id. at 962; Timpanogos Planning v. Central 
Utah Water, 690 P.2d 562, 564-65 (Utah 
1984). In addition, those who assert that a 
statute is unconstitutional bear the burden of 
demonstrating that it is unconstitutional. Rio 
Algom Corp. v. San Juan County, 681 P.2d 
184, 191 (Utah 1984). 
Article I, section 13 provides that a preli-
minary hearing may be held after prosecution 
by indictment, but is not required. The 
statute, however, states that a preliminary 
hearing shall not be held if a defendant is 
indicted. The constitution allows the legisla-
ture the discretion, therefore, to prohibit 
preliminary hearings after indictment, and 
such prohibition falls within the constitutional 
language. As a result, the statute is not in 
direct conflict with the constitution. 
IV. GRAND JURY TESTIMONY 
Tolman also asserts that the trial court erred 
in failing to suppress his grand jury testimony 
at trial. Tolman claims that his grand jury 
testimony was inadmissible because he was not 
informed of his right to counsel nor wajjie 
informed that he was the target of the invest-
igation prior to'^ TestiTying before the grand 
jury. " ~""^  
In reviewing a trial court's evidentiary 
rulings, we defer to the trial court's advanta-
geous position and will not overturn its deci-
sions absent an abuse of discretion. Whitehead 
v. American Motors Sales Corp., 101 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 27, 28 (Feb. 2, 1989). 
Utah Code Ann. §77-11-3 (1982) prov-
ides: 
CODE*Co 
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Any person called to testify before 
the grand jury may be advised of 
his right to be represented by 
counsel. If a witness is or becomes 
a subject of the investigation, he 
shall be advised of that fact and of 
his right to counsel, and of his 
i rivilege against self incrimination. ^ n demand of a witness for repre-
sentation by counsel, the proceed-
ings shall be delayed until counsel is 
present. 
In State v. Ruggeri, 19 Utah 2d 216, 429 P.2d 
969, 975 (1967), the Utah Supreme Court 
stated that a witness, who was unaware that 
he was a target of a grand jury investigation, 
could not intelligently determine whether or 
not he needed counsel where Jie_ was_jiot 
advised of the charges against himTlnH'uggeri, >^ 
tfie witness testifie1T~T>efore* the grand 
jury and was later indicted for alleged perjury 
committed during his grand jury testimony. 
The court held that because the witness was 
not aware that he was a target of the grand 
jury proceeding, the trial court properly excl-
uded his grand jury testimony in his perjury 
trial. Id. 
In this case, special prosecutors Rodney 
Snow and Larry Keller, and grand jury inve-
stigator Lorin C. Brooks met Tolman outside 
the grand jury room prior to his testimony 
and advised him that he was the subject o.£ the 
grand jury inquiry. Tolman responded that he 
did not realize he was a subject. Snow and 
Keller then told Tolman that he had the right 
to have counsel present outside the courtroom, r 
that he could talk to an attorney before testi-
fying, and that if he wanted to contact an 
attorney at any time he could. Tolman resp-
onded that he had an attorney and that he was 
aware of his rights. He also stated he was 
willing to appear despite the prosecutors' 
offer to postpone his testimony. Tolman then 
took the witness stand and acknowledged that 
he had a right to counsel. About a month 
later, when Tolman again testified before the 
grand jury, he was again informed of his right 
to counsel. Unlike Ruggeri, Tolman knew he 
was a/target/of the grand jury investigation, 
prior to testifying-. In addition, he was into-
rmed of his right to counsel. Therefore, we 
hold that the trial court did not err in admit-
ting Tolman's grand jury testimony into evi-
dence. 
V. JUROR AFFIDAVITS 
Tolman also asserts that his motion to arrest 
judgment should have been granted because a 
juror affidavit established that the verdict 
resulted from a divine revelation. Tolman 
contends that the trial court erred in ruling 
that the affidavit failed to show that an imp-
roper outside influence was present in the jury 
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room. 
Generally, a juror affidavit can only be used 
to impeach a jury verdict when.^lythe verdict 
was determined by chance or bribery, Rose-
nlof v. Sullivan, 676 P.2d 372, 375 (Utah 
1983); Hillier v. Lambom.J240 P.2d 300, 304 
(Utah Ct. App. 1987); orgywhen "extraneous 
prejudicial information was improperly 
brought to the jury's attention or an outside 
influence was improperly brought to bear 
upon any juror." Utah R. Evid. 606(b); State 
v. DeMUlc, 756 P.2d 81, 83 (Utah 1988); Hillier, 
740 P.2d at 304. The reason for nar-
rowly limiting the circumstances under which 
jury affidavits can be used to impeach a jury 
verdict is that otherwise, litigants would obtain 
juror affidavits on "all manner of things" and 
the process would become interminable and 
impracticable. Wheat v. Denver & R.C.W.R. 
Co., 122 Utah 418, 250 P.2d 932, 937 (1952). 
Further, "[s]uch post mortems would be pro-
ductive of no end of mischief and render 
service as a juror unbearable." Id. 
In State v. DeMille, 756 P.2d 81 (Utah 
1988), the Utah Supreme Court considered 
whether a juror's affidavit regarding a divine 
revelation could be used to impeach the jury's 
verdict under Utah R. Evid. 606(b). In DeMille, 
a juror affidavit stated that £ne ~7ur5fr 
allegedly told another juror during deliberat-
ions that she had prayed for a sign during 
closing argument as to DeMille's guilt and 
claimed to have received a revelation that if 
defense counsel did not make eye contact, 
DeMille was guilty. Defense counsel did not 
make eye contact and DeMille was found 
guilty. 
In reviewing whether the juror affidavit 
should have been admitted under Utah R. 
Evid. 606(b), the court stated that construing 
e"outside influence" to include responses to 
J prayer could well infringe upon the juror's 
{religious liberties, id. at 84. The court stated 
that as long as the juror can fairly weigh the 
evidence and apply the law to the facts, the 
juror's decision cannot be challenged on the 
jground that the juror reached the decision by 
(jiid of prayer. Id. Accordingly, the court held 
that under Rule 606(b), prayer and supposed 
responses to prayer are not included within the 
meaning of the words "outside influence." Id. 
The court also noted, however, that a juror 
might be disqualified from service if he or she 
is unable to fairly consider the evidence and 
properly apply the law due to oracular signs. Id. 
The court then found that this fact did not 
save DeMille's challenge to the verdict for two 
reasons. Id. First, the affidavit did not aver 
facts which would disqualify a juror. Second, 
even if the affidavit averred such facts, the 
court stated, 
[a] claim that a juror is so affected 
by religious conviction as to disqu-
alify him or her from service does 
not fall within these exceptions 
[Rule 606(b)]; rather it goes to the 
fitness of the person to serve on the 
jury, a matter that could and 
should have been raised at voir dire. 
Id. at 85. 
Applying the law to the facts in this case, 
we need not reach whether the affidavit 
alleged^Tact^ that would disqualify any juror 
because, according to UeMille, juror affidavits 
regarding divine revelations do not fall within 
the exception set forth in Rule 606(b). There-
fore, we hold that the trial court did not err in 
excluding the juror affidavit. 
We have examined the Qther issues raised in 
this appeal and conclude that those issues are 
without merit. Affirmed in part and reversed 
in part. 
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge 
I CONCUR: 
Regnal W. Garff, Judge 
1 CONCUR IN THE RESULT: 
Richard C. Davidson, Judge 
Che as 
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IN THE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
G.G.A., INC., an Indiana Corporation, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
Toula K. LEVENTIS, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
No. 870546-CA 
FILED: April 28, 1989 
Third District, Salt Lake County 
Honorable J. Dennis Frederick 
ATTORNEYS: 
Nick J. Colessides, Salt Lake City, for 
Appellant 
Bryan A. Larson, Salt Lake City, for 
Respondent 
Before Judges Davidson, Greenwood, and 
Orme. 
OPINION 
GREENWOOD, Judge: 
This case involves real property occupied by 
G.G.A., Inc., doing business as a Wendy's 
Old Fashioned Hamburgers restaurant, located 
at about 550 East 400 South in Salt Lake City, 
Utah. Toula Leventis (Leventis), who leased 
the property to G.G.A., appeals from the trial 
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jury on numerous felony charges including conspi-
racy, tampering with a witness, and tampering with 
evidence. After trial, the jury returned a verdict of 
not guilty on the felony charges but guilty on the 
lesser included offense of attempted tampering with 
evidence, a violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-8-
510 (1979), a class A misdemeanor. Harman seeks 
reversal of that conviction claiming the evidence was 
insufficient to support the verdict. We reverse. 
In May 1983, a fire caused extensive damage to the 
Fashion Place Plaza in Murray, Utah. At the time, 
the Salt Lake County's mental health department 
had its offices in the building. Dean Larsen, assistant 
chief of the Murray City Fire Department, began an 
immediate investigation into the cause and origin of 
the fire. The next morning, Larsen met with Evan 
Stephens, (Salt Lake County's risk manager) and 
Lou Midgley, deputy county attorney. At the 
meeting, Larsen stated that the fire had started in the 
mental health offices. Stephens testified that he 
thought such an opinion was premature especially 
since substantial county liability was possible. Step-
hens requested assistance in his investigation of the 
fire from the investigative division of the county 
attorney's office. The request was sent to Harman, 
who was then chief of the investigations division. 
Harman assigned Ralph Tolman and Olin Yearby to 
the case. Ralph Tolman and Dean Larsen were old 
friends. 
Upon arrival at the scene, Tolman and Yearby met 
with Larsen, discussed Larsen's view of the origin of 
the fire, and then began digging through the rubble 
together. In spite of this joint activity, all three later 
testified that they each conducted an independent 
investigation. Larsen and Tolman became convinced 
that a space heater and an electrical extension cord 
found in the mental health offices had been the cause 
of the fire. 
Within a couple of days, Stephens and Midgeley 
became concerned that a truly independent investig-
ator was needed. The county contracted with Jim 
Ashby of Global Investigations for that service. 
Harman was told of the new investigator but the 
evidence is conflicting whether Tolman and Yearby 
were to continue. It is clear that they stopped 
working on the case shortly thereafter. 
Meanwhile, the space heater and the extension 
cord were sent for analysis. The laboratory report 
indicated that electrical current had not been present 
in either the heater or the cord when those objects 
burned. Ashby relied on this report in determining 
that the heater and cord could not have started the 
fire. He concluded the fire started in the roof above 
the mental health offices. Larsen disregarded the 
laboratory report and held firm in his earlier concl-
usion that the heater and cord had caused the fire. 
Although both Larsen and Harman had been pre-
ssuring Tolman for his report, it was not written and 
submitted for approval until August. Both the labo-
ratory report and Ashby's full investigation report 
preceeded Tolman's report. Tolman first submitted 
the report to his immediate supervisor, Sam Dawson, 
who rejected it. Tolman objected and demanded that 
it be sent to Harman, who received the report and 
also rejected it. In a heated discussion, Harman told 
Tolman to write a new report. Tolman did so but 
kept a copy of the first report in his investigation file 
and also gave a copy to the Murray City Fire Chief, 
Wendell Coombs. Also, Harman sent a copy of 
Tolman's first report to William Hyde, supervisor of 
the county attorney's civil division, and possibly 
several others. 
UTAH ADVA! 
35 
In 1985, Larsen disclosed the existence of the first 
Tolman report during a deposition conducted purs-
uant to a civil suit over Salt Lake County's liability 
for the fire. An inquiry by the grand jury and this 
case followed. 
On appeal, Harman questions the sufficiency of 
the evidence, the admission of certain hearsay evid-
ence, and the refusal of his request for a bill of 
particulars. We find the first issue dispositive so we 
do not reach the others. 
We may review the verdict of a jury in a criminal 
case and reverse as a matter of law if we find the 
evidence is insufficient. See State v. Cantu, 750 P.2d 
591, 593 (Utah 1988). However, the standard for 
reversal is high. "We reverse ... only when the evid-
ence ... is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently 
improbable that reasonable minds must have entert-
ained a reasonable doubt that the defendant comm-
itted the crime ...." State v. Pefree, 659 P.2d 443, 
444 (Utah 1983). The weight and credibility to be 
given a witness is an exclusive funaion of the jury. State 
v. Lamm, 606 P.2d 229, 231 (Utah 1980). Fur-
thermore, all evidence and reasonable inferences 
drawn therefrom must be reviewed in a light most 
favorable to the jury's verdict. Peiree, 659 P.2d at 
444. 
Although this is a high standard, it is not insurm-
ountable. We will not make "speculative leap[s] 
across ... remaining gap[s]" in the evidence. Id. at 
445. Every element of the crime charged must be 
proven beyond a reasonable doubt. If the evidence 
does not support those elements, the verdict must 
fail. 
Utah Code Ann. §76-8-510(1) (1978) defines 
the crime of tampering with evidence. To be guilty, 
an actor must have altered, destroyed, concealed, or 
removed an item with the purpose to impair its verity 
or availability to a pending, or potential, official 
proceeding or investigation.1 A person must have the 
same culpability to attempt to tamper with evidence. 
Utah Code Ann. §76-4-101(1) (1978). 
We now consider the evidence presented in this 
case in a light most favorable to the jury's verdict. 
Harman was chief of the investigations division of 
the Salt Lake County Attorney's Office. Part of his 
duties were to review and approve or disapprove 
reports written by investigators. Reports could be 
rejected for content as well as form. Harman testi-
fied he thought Tolman's first report "parroted" 
Dean Larsen's opinion, contained unsupported 
factual assertions, and was a "bad report." Further-
more, at approximately the same time as Harman 
rejected the report, he told William Hyde and Lou 
Midgley about Tolman's opinion and gave a copy of 
the report to Hyde. Hyde, in turn, told the county 
commissioners about Tolman's opinion. Hyde and 
Midgley had requested the investigation in the first 
place and, at that time, were in charge of the 
county's defense of any liability claims arising from 
the fire. Copies of the report were kept in several 
files, including Hyde's case file and Tolman's inve-
stigative file. The documents in these files were ava-
ilable to the deputy county attorneys who responded 
to discovery and Hyde produced his copy of the 
Tolman report for the grand jury. There is no evid-
ence that Harman made any attempt to alter, destroy 
or remove the report from these files or to influence 
others who knew of the report. 
On the other hand, the prosecution introduced 
evidence that Harman had said that the report would 
make the county look bad, cost the county millions, 
and make the county liable. 
NCE REPORTS 
Harman 
dv. Rep. 34 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
36 State v. Harman 99 Utah Adv. Rep. 34 CODC#CC Provo, Uut 
In these circumstances, it became critical for the 
state to show that Harman's rejection of Tolman's 
report was improper. The state failed to do this. 
Culpability can be implied from the actions and sta-
tements of the defendant, but the evidence must be 
clear enough that the jury does not have to guess. 
We believe that the evidence of guilt was so slight, so 
conflicting, and so inherently improbable that reas-
onable minds could not have concluded that Harman 
rejected the report in an attempt to alter, destroy, 
conceal or remove it to impair its verity or availabi-
lity, rather than rejecting it because it was a "bad 
report." 
We, therefore, hold that the evidence was insuffi-
cient to establish the required mental state. Since the 
state failed to prove that critical element, Harman's 
conviction is reversed. 
Richard C. Davidson, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
Regnal W Garff, Judge 
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge 
1. The full text of §76-8-510(1) reads: 
A person commits a felony of the 
second degree if, believing that an offi-
cial proceeding or investigation is 
pending or about to be instituted, he: 
(1) Alters, destroys, conceals, or 
removes anything with a purpose to 
impair its verity or availability in the 
proceeding or investigation.... 
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State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
Ralph Tolman and Claude Donald 
Harman, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Before Judges Orme, Davidson/ and Bench. 
ORDER 
DENYING PETITION FOR REHEARING 
Court of Appeals No. 870407-CA 
THIS MATTER having come before the Court upon 
Appellant's Petition for Rehearing, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Petition for Rehearing is 
denied. 
DATED th is ^Zfll day of May, 1989. 
FOR TfcE COURT: 
'Mary y v Noonan 
c / e r W o f the Court 
E Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the 23rd day of May, 1989, a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR 
REHEARING was mailed to each of the parties named below by 
depositing the same in the United States mail. 
Loni F. DeLand 
Scott W, Reed 
McRae & DeLand 
Attorneys for Defendant and Appellant 
132 South 600 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
R. Paul Van Dam 
State Attorney General 
Dan R. Larsen 
A s s i s t a n t Attorney General 
B U I L D I N G M A I L 
Rodney G. Snow 
Attorney at Law 
Clyde & Pratt 
200 American Savings Plaza 
77 West 200 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Larry R. Keller 
Attorney at Law 
257 Towers, Suite 340 
257 East 200 South - 10 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Edward K. Brass 
Attorney at Law 
321 South 600 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
DATED this 22nd day of May, 1989. 
By "~~~"- <&A'S6t / ,Z£S 
Case Manager ^" 
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LARRY R. KELLER #1785 
No. 8 East Broadway 
Judge Building, Suite 426 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-7282 
RODNEY G. SNOW #3028 
200 American Savings Plaza-' 
77 West 200 South \ "/;' 
Salt Lake City, Utah 8410.1-
Telephone: (801) 322-2516 
Special Counsel and Prosecutors Pro Tempore — 
Salt Lake County Special Grand Jury, 1986 Term 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
CLAUDE DONALD HARMAN, AND 
RALPH TOLMAN, 
Defendants. 
The matter of discovery came before the above-entitled Court 
on January 30, 1987 with Larry R. Keller present and representing 
Plaintiff, and Defendant Harman present and represented by Edward 
K. Brass. Scott Reed, representing Defendant Tolman was also 
present. After hearing arguments of counsel, the Court hereby 
ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND DECREES: 
1. Counsel for Plaintiff shall provide to Defendant Barman's 
and Defendant Tolman's attorneys, at Defendants* expense, one 
copy of all transcripts of the testimony of persons who appeared 
FILED IN CLERKS OFFICE 
Salt Lake County Utah 
SUffLfintNTAL UKUtK 
Case No. CR-86-1522 
(Judge Raymond Uno) 
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before the Salt Lake County Grand Jury on the matter which gave 
rise to the Indictment in the above-entitled case. 
2. No person receiving a copy of the transcript of testi-
mony before the Grand Jury shall allow any person other than a 
member of the staff of the attorney or the Defendant himself to 
view or read said transcript. Further, it is ordered that no 
other copies of the transcript of Grand Jury testimony shall be 
created without specific permission of the court. It is further 
ordered that any violation of the above orders shall subject the 
violator to the full contempt powers of this Court. 
DATED this day of February, 1987. 
RAYMOND S. TJNO T 
Tni/rd District Court'.(Judge 
G00166 
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LARRY R. KELLER (1785) 
257 Towers, Suite 340 
257 East 200 South, Box 10 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-7282 
RODNEY G. SNOW (3028) 
200 American Savings Plaza 
77 West 200 South 
Salt- Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 322-2516 
FILED IN CLERK'S OFFICE 
Salt Lake County Utah 
OCT 8 1987 
Special Counsel and Prosecutors Pro Tempore — 
Salt Lake County Special Grand Jury, 1986 Term 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
VS. 
Plaintiff, 
CLAUDE DONALD HARMAN and 
RALPH TOLMAN, 
Defendants. 
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT 
RALPH TOLMAN'S MOTION 
FOR A NEW TRIAL 
Case No. CR-86-1522 
Judge Raymond Uno 
Came on regularly for hearing on the 19th day of August, 1987, 
Defendant's motion for a new trial and the Court having read the 
memoranda filed by the parties and having considered the arguments of 
counsel, and being fully advised in the premises, now therefor 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 
1. That Defendant's motion for a new trial is denied; and 
G 
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2. That the Affidavit of Karl E. Anderson be stricken from the 
record. 
DATED this 8th day of October, 1987. 
BY THE COURT: 
Raymond Uno 
District Judge _ 
ATTEST 
H DiXON KiNDLEY 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE By ^  Atf klfci% J\jX** "^ ' 
I \^ Deputy Clerk 
I hereby certify that I served true and correct copies of the 
foregoing, by placing said copies in the United States mail, postage 
prepaid, this 8th day of October, 1987, to the following: 
Edward K. Brass, Esq. Loni F. DeLand, Esq. 
321 South 600 East Scott W. Reed, Esq. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 McRae & DeLand 
132 South 600 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
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LONI F. DeLAND (0862) 
SCOTT W. REED (4124) 
McRAE & DeLAND 
132 South 600 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 364-1333 
Attorneys for Defendant Tolman 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
V. 
CLAUDE DONALD HARMAN, and 
RALPH TOLMAN, 
Defendant. 
FACTS 
On April 9, 1986, Ralph R. Tolman appeared before the 
Salt Lake County Grand Jury pursuant to a subpoena issued by 
authority of that body. At no time prior to his appearance was 
he informed that he was a subject or "target" of the Grand Jury 
investigation. 
As Tolman was being brought before the Grand Jury for 
testimony, he was instructed orally by Special Prosecutor Larry 
Keller that he was a "target". When Tolman stated that he no 
longer wished to remain to testify, Keller then stated that 
FILED IN CLERKS OFFICE 
Salt Lake County Utah 
EEB 1 3 1987 
;uiy CMrk 
MEMORANDUM 
Case No. CR 86-1522 
Judge Raymond Uno 
H 
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Tolman must stay pursuant to the subpoena, as well as the docu-
ments Tolman had brought. 
On the record before the Grand Jury, it was "suggested" 
that Tolman was a subject of the investigation and that he had a 
right to have counsel "present" outside the Grand Jury room. 
(Tolman testimony, April 9, 1986, p.2.) At no point was Tolman 
informed of the potential charges against him. 
It should be noted that at least two other potential 
subjects of the Grand Jury investigation received letters so 
informing them in advance of their appearance before the Grand 
Jury. (Harman testimony, April 17, 1986, p.5; Dawson testimony, 
April 15, 1986, p.2.) 
ARGUMENT 
With regard to the appearance and testimony before the 
Grand Jury of an investigation subject or "target", the Utah 
Supreme Court has ruled that such person is more than just a 
witness, but an accused within the meaning of Article I, Section 
Twelve of the Utah Constitution. State v. Ruggeri, 19 U.2d 216, 
429 P.2d 969 (1967). In that case, a county commissioner named 
Brady was subpoenaed before the Grand Jury but not informed that 
he was a target of the investigation. Based upon his testimony, 
Brady was subsequently prosecuted for perjury. Prior to trial, 
the district court judge (Ruggeri) granted a motion to suppress 
the use of said testimony as evidence. 
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The plaintiff filed a proceeding before the Supreme 
Court for a writ to compel Ruggeri to reverse his decision, which 
the Supreme Court declined to do. The court also ruled that: 
". . . one being investigated for crime is 
not just a witness and cannot be treated as 
such. The target of an investigation is an 
accused within the meaning of the Constitu-
tion, and when he is detained in any signifi-
cant way, he may not be interrogated unless 
he is advised of the charges against him then 
under consideration. To fail to so warn one 
so being investigated is to entrap him and to 
violate his constitutional privilege against 
self-incrimination." 
429 P.2d at 973. [Emphasis added.] 
The court further observed that the violation occurs notwith-
standing any assertion of Fifth Amendment privilege, and that the 
immunity is complete. 
The court concludes its observation as follows: 
"It would seem that a witness who is unaware 
that he is a target of a grand jury inves-
tigation could not intelligently determine 
whether or not he needed counsel unless he 
was fully advised of the charges being 
considered against him; and until he has full 
knowledge regarding this matter, he will not 
know when to assert his constitutional claim 
of privilege against self-incrimination. It 
would also be difficult to believe that he 
could intelligently waive the right to 
counsel under such circumstances." 
429 P.2d at 975. 
It is clear that Tolman had no notice of his target 
status prior to appearance at the Grand Jury. Once at the Grand 
>Jury, his appearance was "custodial" requiring complete Miranda 
admonition. As in Ruggeri, it is difficult to believe Tolman 
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could be fully apprised of his rights unless he had known and had 
the opportunity to share with counsel his status as a subject. 
For that reason alone the indictment should be guashed 
or the testimony suppressed as evidence against either Defendant, 
DATED this / 3 day of February, 1987. 
^TONI F. D e L A N D r 
Attorney for Defendant Tolman 
£j£t 
SCOTT W. REED ^^" 
Attorney for Defendant Tolman 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the j>3 day of February, 
1987, a true and correct copy of the foregoing was hand-delivered 
to Larry R. Keller, Judge Building, #426, 8 East 300 South, Salt 
Lake City, Utah 84111; Rodney G. Snow, 77 West 200 South, Salt 
Lake City, Utah 84101; and Edward K. Brass, 321 South 600 East, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102. 
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LONI F. DeLAND 
SCOTT W. REED 
McRAE & DeLAND 
132 South 600 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 364-1333 
Attorneys for Defendant Tolman 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, ) MOTION FOR A BILL OF 
) PARTICULARS 
v. ) 
DONALD CLAUDE HARMAN and ) Case No. CR-86-1522 
RALPH TOLMAN, ) 
) Judge Raymond Uno 
Defendants. ) 
Defendant, Ralph Tolman, by and through his attorneys, 
Loni F. DeLand and Scott W. Reed, moves the court pursuant to 
Rule 4(3), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, 77-35-4 (amended 
1D80) , to order the production of a statement of particular 
factual information regarding the following: 
1. With regard to Count I and Count II: 
a. State the exact date, time, location and general 
nature of the agreement constituting the conspiracy as charged in 
Count I. 
b. State the intended conduct constituting a crime and 
by whom the conduct was performed. 
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c. Describe the nature of the official proceeding or 
investigation pending or about to be instigated. 
d. State the specific basis for alleging that Defen-
dant Tolman believed such proceeding or investigation as de-
scribed above was pending or about to be instigated. 
e. State the specific manner in which Defendant Tolman 
is alleged to have altered, destroyed, concealed, or removed the 
investigative report. 
f. Specify what presentation or use of a false report 
was made by Defendant Tolman for the purpose of deceiving a 
public servant or servants, and specify which public servant(s). 
2. With regard to Count IV: 
a. State the specific acts alleged to have been 
committed by Defendant Tolman to induce or cause C. Dean Larsen 
to withhold testimony, information documents or things. 
b. Specify which element of testimony, information, 
document or thing was alleged to have been the subject of such 
inducement or cause, beside the seven page report. 
c. State whether said report was in fact withheld by 
C. Dean Larsen. 
d. State the date# time, location and general nature 
of acts alleged. 
e. Describe the nature of the official proceeding or 
investigation which was pending or about to be instituted. 
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f. State the specific basis for alleging that Defen-
dant Tolman believed that such proceeding or investigation as 
described above was pending or about to be instituted. 
3, With regard to Count V: 
a* State the specific nature of the benefit or harm 
intended by Defendant Tolman. 
b. State the specific acts which Defendant Tolman 
performed or failed to perform. 
c. State the specific basis upon which it is alleged 
that the acts or omissions performed by Defendant Tolman were 
knowingly performed. 
DATED this / day of December, 1986. 
LONI F. D e L A N D ' 
Attorney for Defendant Tolman 
SCOTT W. REED 
Attorney for Defendant Tolman 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that'on the / day of December, 
1986, a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed, with 
postage prepaid fully thereon, to Larry R. Keller, #8 East 
Broadway, Judge Building, Suite 426, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111; 
Rodney G. Snow, American Plaza, 77 West 200 South, Salt Lake 
City, Utah 84101; and Edward K. Brass, 321 South 600 East, Salt 
Lake City, Utah 84102. 
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Salt Lake County, UtaL 
LONI F. DeLAND (0862) 
SCOTT W. REED (4124) 
McRAE & DeLAND 
132 South 600 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 364-1333 
Attorneys for Defendant Tolman 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, ) AFFIDAVIT OF KARL 
) ANDERSON 
v. ) 
) Case No. CR86-1522 
CLAUDE DONALD HARMAN and ) 
RALPH TOLMAN, ) Judge Raymond S. Uno 
Defendants. ) 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
I, Karl Anderson, being first duly sworn upon my oath, 
depose and state: 
1. Affiant, Karl Anderson, was a juror in the 
above-captioned case. 
2. After the second day of jury deliberation in this 
matter, the jury was in agreement that Defendant Tolman's guilt 
had not been established on any charge and the jury was 6-2 in 
favor of acquittal as to Defendant Harman. 
AUG 19 198/ 
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3. Several jurors wished to break at or about 5:00 
p.m. due mostly to church obligations (L.D.S.). I expressed a 
desire to remain since our verdict (of acquittal) seemed close at 
hand. 
4. One juror, a professed L.D.S. seminary teacher, who 
was the strong force for conviction, suggested we join in a group 
prayer to obtain divine guidance in our deliberations. 
5. I was unhappy about the interjection of religion 
but five other jurors seemed to follow the seminary teachers lead 
on most matters and agreed to participate in the prayer. 
6. I essentially ignored the prayer but I did note 
that immediately following the prayer the seminary teacher 
expressed a certain knowledge gained from the exercise. 
7. I do not recall whether he claimed inspiration, 
revelation or some other such guidance but he almost immediately 
convinced the other five jurors of need to find the Defendants 
guilty and from that point on, those six jurors became totally 
immovable. 
8. It was obvious that from that moment on the jurors 
who prayed would not be swayed in spite of their previous beliefs 
that the evidence was insufficient. 
9. As stated in my prior affidavit, I eventually gave 
in to convictions because the majority wouldn't consider changing 
and I was not aware we could be a hung jury. There is no ques-
tion that the seminary teacher's call for prayer and subsequent 
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expressions of his knowledge of what was required of the jury was 
the reason for guilty verdicts. 
DATED this / ^ day of August, 1987. 
*ARL ANDERSON 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this / ^ / day of 
August, 1987. 
-NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing at Salt Lake City, Utah 
My Commission Expires: (#~ U —tfQ 
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FILED IN CLERKS OFFICE 
Salt Lake County Utah 
LONI F. DeLAND (0862) 
SCOTT W. REED (4124) 
McRAE & DeLAND 
132 South 600 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 364-1333 
Attorneys for Defendant Tolman 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
V. 
CLAUDE DONALD HARMAN and ] 
RALPH TOLMAN, 
Defendants. 
1 AFFIDAVIT OF KARL E. 
\ ANDERSON 
i Case No. CR-86-1522 
Judge Raymond Uno 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
I, KARL E. ANDERSON, being first duly sworn upon my 
oath, depose and state: 
1. I am a resident of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, 
residing at 3421 South 7860 West in Magna, Utah. 
2. Commencing on February 17, 1987 until March 6, 
1987, I served as one of eight jurors in the case of State of 
Utah v. Claude Donald Harman and Ralph Tolman. 
MAY 4 1987 
~~ \ dsP-.'iy Clerk 
J - 2 0
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3. At no time during the trial or jury deliberations 
did I form any opinion or belief that Ralph Tolman was guilty of 
any of the charges. 
4. At no time was I instructed or led to believe that 
I need not return a verdict or could withhold my verdict result-
ing in no decision by the jury, 
5. Had I known or been instructed that withholding my 
vote and maintaining a position of not guilty was allowable and 
would not result in prolonged deliberation, I would not have cast 
a vote of guilty in this case. 
6. Since the time of trial and deliberation, my belief 
in this matter has not changed. 
DATED this */ day of May, 1987. 
/^r^ JC^^ 
RARL E. ANDERSON 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this V day of 
May, 1987. 
-NOTARY'PUBLIC 
Residing at Salt Lake City, Utah 
My Commission Expires: [0- fc -$n 
0oo 
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY t I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the T day of May, 1987, a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing was hand-delivered to 
Edward K. Brass, 321 South 600 East, Salt Lake City, Utah 84102; 
Larry R. Keller, Judge Building #426, 8 East 300 South, Salt Lake 
City, Utah 84111; and Rodney G. Snow, American Plaza, 77 West 200 
South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101. *t- C&tk.*. cf'C^a^ef 
75—«*w.25r s<^_^7 Sf^ 
v 
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ADDENDUM £ 
PORTIONS OF TRANSCRIPT OF TRIAL 
PROCEEDINGS, FEBRUARY 25, 1987; 
STATE V. TOLMAN AND HARMAN, 
CR-86-1522; R. 945 ET SEQ. 
TESTIMONY OF C. DEAN LARSEN 
SELECTED PAGES 
RE: TOLMAN TAMPERING ALLEGATIONS 
Mr. Snow's Direct: 951-954 
Mr. DeLand's Cross: 957, 959-964 
DeLand's Redirect: 999, 1001, 1002 
Mr. DeLand's Recross: 1006, 1007 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
-ooOoo-
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CLAUDE DONALD HARMAN and 
RALPH TOLMAN, 
Criminal No. CR-86-1522 
Defendants. ©FY 
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS 
February 25, 1987 
BEFORE THE HONORABLE RAYMOND S. UNO 
District Court Judge 
A P P E A R A N C E S ; 
For t h e S t a t e o f Utah: RODNEY G. SNOW 
Attorney at Law 
77 West 200 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
-and-
LARRY R. KELLER 
Attorney at Law 
8 East Broadway #426 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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tell defendant Tolman you had not destroyed the report? 
A. 
Q. 
a telephone 
No. 
After your second deposition, did you have 
call with defendant Tolman, a telephone 
conversation? 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
I take it? 
A. 
Q. 
Yes. 
And were you in your office? 
Yes. 
Did you call Mr. Tolman? 
Yes. 
This would be sometime in November of 1984, SIC 
That's correct. 
Was there anyone present in your office when 
you made the telephone call, sir? 
A. 
Q. 
No. 
Do you know whether anyone else was on the 
line when you talked to Mr. Tolman? 
A. 
Q. 
1 he said to ; 
A. 
in_ the depo 
1 you have to 
J himself and 
I don't know. 
Can you tell us what you said to him and what 
you on this occasion? j 
I told Ralph ^ that his report was coming out 
sition and his response was, "Dean, do what | 
do, tell the truth, Ralph will take care of | 
he will tell the truth." 
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Q. Okay. Did you tell him anything else about 
how you handled the report in the first deposition? 
- v » < ' 
A. No. 
Qo Do you recall whether you told him you had 
skated around the issue? 
Yes, 
Q. The report issue? 
A. Yes. 
Q. You didn't tell him the report had actually 
10 I come out? 
11 A. I believe I told him that — 
12 Q. I mean that — 
13 A. They talked about the report in the deposition. 
14 Q. All right. Did defendant Tolman say anything 
15 else? Did he express any concern at that point? 
16 A. Just "Here, Dean," that for me to tell the 
17 truth and that Ralph ^would take care of himself and he 
18 would tell the truth. 
19 Q. Did he express that he wished it hadn't come 
20 .up? 
21 A. Yes, he did. 
22 Q. What do you recall him saying in that regard? 
23 A. "I wished it wouldn't have to come out, but 
24 if it does, here, Dean, tell the truth." 
25 Q. Okay. You understood him to be telling you 
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1 to tell the truth about what Ralph's opinion and conclusions 
2 might have been about the cause and origin of the fire? 
3 A. That's correct. 
4 Q. After the second deposition in December of 1985/ 
5 did you again — and after you had released the report at 
6 the deposition, did you again telephone Mr. Tolman? 
7 A. Yes. 
8 1 Q. Do you recall whether you telephoned him before 
9 this deposition or was it after? 
.. .I i I , . i n i , i ^ 
10 A. As far as I can recall, after the deposition. 
11 Q. Do you recall when you first made the telephone 
12 call to the office, the County Attorney's Office, whether 
13 you spoke to Ralph? 
14 A. I talked to — I asked for Ralph. Ralph was 
15 not in. I talked to Olin Yearby. 
16 I Q. What did you tell Olin Yearby? 
17 A. That the»report had come out and they had copies 
18 of it. 
19 Q. What did Olin Yearby say? 
20 A. "Oh, shit, Larsen. I wish it wouldn't have. 
21 Ralph is probably in deep trouble." 
22 Q. Did you thereafter receive a telephone call 
23 from Tolman? 
24 A. I don't recall if Ralph called me back or if 
25 I called him. 
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1 Q. But subsequent to the Yearby conversation, you 
2 had another conversation about the deposition with Mr. Tolma4 
3 A. Thatsf correct. 
4 Q. Where were you when that conversation occurred? 
5 A. In my office. 
6 Q. As far as you know, Mr. Tolman was at work? 
7 A. As far as I know. 
8 1 Q. What was said in that conversation? 
9 A. I wished it wouldn't have come out, but ithas, 
10 you was under oath. You told the truth. Ralph will tell 
U the truth. Ralph can take care of himself. 
12 Q.
 % Did defendant Tolman express any concern tp 
13 y<?u about what was going to happen next? 
14 A. He was worried. He knew there was problems 
15 with his job and he was very concerned about that. 
16 I Q. Okay. Sir, I am going to hand you your grand 
17 jury testimony of April 9th. If you could turn to page 
18 17, please. Now, Mr. Larsen, turning to the conversation, 
19 telephone conversation, you had with defendant Tolman in 
20 - August of 1983 after you had received the report in which 
21 he suggested to you you get rid of the report or burn it 
22 or destroy it, I would like you to read, if you would, please, 
23 lines 13 through 19. 
24 A. "He thinks we're friends and I am helping you 
25 on the investigation of the fire," something to that effect. 
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\ A. Yes, 
2 Q. And was that testimony accurate when you gave 
3 it before the grand jury? 
4 A. Yes. 
5 J MR. SNOW: Thank you. 
6 
7 I CROSS-EXAMINATION 
S BY MR. DeLAND: 
9 I Q. Morning, Chief. You told us yesterday that 
JO this report, this report of Ralph Tolman's came to your 
jj attention fry way of Chief Coombs; is that correct? 
12 A. That's correct. 
13 Q. Who was your boss? 
14 A. Yes. 
15 Q. And so your understanding is that the report 
16 went from Mr. Tolman to Chief Coombs to yourself? 
17 A. That's correct. 
18 Q. You don't recall receiving any report directly 
19 from Mr. Tolman to you? 
20 r A. I don't recall. 
21 Q. Do you recall picking up any reports at 
22 Mr. Tolman's office from Joan Binkerd or from any other 
23 source? 
24 A. No. 
25 Q. Do you recall being over there during that period 
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1 THE COURT: He may answer. 
2 Q. (By Mr. DeLand) • Did he ever make such a 
3 statement to you? ^ 
4 A. Could you reask the question again, please? 
5 Q. Yes. Did Chief Coombs, at or about the time 
6 he gave you the Tolman report, say anything such as "Ralph 
7 gave me this report and told me not to use it unless we 
8 had to, not to disclose it to Don Harman," that we had it 
9 but that he would tell the truth and we should? 
10 A. I recall some sort of a conversation like that 
, , ^ 
11 Q« All right. And in fact a conversation you have 
12 not told us about yet today occurred at the very time Ralph 
13 talked to you about concealing this report or destroying 
14 this report or getting rid of it; isn't that true? There 
15 was a conversation you had with Ralph at that time that 
16 you haven't reported. Isn't that correct? You haven't 
17 been asked about it? 
18 MR. SNOW: Your Honor, I don't think the question 
19 is clear. I would object — 
20 MR. DeLAND: Maybe it's not. It wouldn't be 
21 the first time I asked an unclear question. 
22 Q. Let me ask you this: You had a conversation 
23 with Ralph Tolman at the time you already told us about 
24 concerning his request that you conceal this report, for 
25 lack of a better word; is that right? 
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A. That's correct. 
Q. All right. And at that time you have testified 
that he said "Destroy the report. Get rid of the report," 
words to that effect? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. All right. He also told you not to physically 
destroy the report, didn't he? 
A. I don't recall the exact verbiage. 
Q. All right. In fact, you do recall vividly that 
he said "Harman is hot"? 
A. I do recall that. 
Q. All right. You don't remember the exact verbiage 
of anything else, what was said at that time, do you? 
A. No. 
Q. But you have repeated certain understandings 
that you had about the conversation? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. And isn't it? true that you understood that he 
merely wanted the fact that you had the report concealed 
• from Mr. Harman? 
A. That's my opinion. j 
Q. He told you in fact at that time, "If you have 
to use it, use it, tell the truth about this report"? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. He never asked you to lie at any time? 
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1 A. No. 
2 Q. In any proceeding? 
3 A. No. 
4 Q. And in fact the term "destroy," that's your 
5 characterization of what was said, isn't it? 
6 A. I don't recall if that was correct verbiage 
7 of my interpretation. 
8 Q. All right. And in fact in your grand jury
 K 
9 testimony you used the word "not disclose"; isn't that right^ 
10 A. I believe I used both words destroy and not 
11 disclose. 
12 Q. All right. Wasn't it the prosecutor that suggested 
13 the word destroy? 
14 A. No. 
15 Q. Would you turn to page 21 of your grand jury 
16 testimony of April 9th of 1986? 
17 A. Which page? 
18 Q. Page 21. I will read the question of Mr. Keller1! 
19 at line 11 and will you read your response? 
20* "Question: Did you suggest to him/'meaning 
21 Tolman, "did you suggest to him that you would 
22 destroy the report or — " 
23 A. "Yes. I told him I would not disclose it." 
24 Q. "Question: Were those your words that you 
25 wouldn't disclose it?" 
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1 Answer? 
2 A. "I can't remember the exact verbiage." 
3
 Q. You did use the word "destroy" in the prior 
* deposition, the second deposition; isn't that correct? 
5 A. That's correct. 
* Q. And the prosecutor recalled to you you did use 
' that word then? 
8 A. That's correct. 
' Q. But you didn't know what the verbiage was? 
10 A. I don't recall the exact verbiage. 
11 Q. You know it's your testimony today your 
12 understanding was physically retain the report, just do^ i't 
13 J,et Mr. Harman see it? 
14 A. That was my interpretation. 
15 Q. All right. And so at the time the report is 
* » ^ 
16 received, your information is "Don't tell any lies about 
17 my opinions about this report," correct? 
18 A. That's correct. 
19 Q. And, again, after the first deposition when 
20 you notify Mr. Tolman that you have skated around the truth,_J| 
21 shall we say, he again told you, "Tell the truth. Ralphy 
22 can take care of himself"? 
23 A. That's correct. 
24 Q^ And then the second^deposition, "Don't worry 
25 I about it. You tell the truth. I am going to tell the trut^ h. 
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Ralph can take care of himself"? 
A. That's correct. 
« * — .., 
Q. And so the concealment, if any, was your loyalty 
to a friend, thinking you were doing what was best for him 
in front of that group of attorneys. 
A. Yes. 
Q. Protecting his job from Mr. Harman. | 
A. Yes. 
Q*. Who you knew he was having very bad relations | 
with at that^time^. 
A. Yes. 
Q. And so when he said, "I wished it hadn't come 
out," he wished it hadn't come out so Mr. Harman woulc^  know | 
about it; isn't that your understanding? 
A. That's my impression. 
Q. At the time you spoke with — during the first 
deposition, Mr. Snow pointed out that the business about 
the report coming up — came up and there was some concern, 
apparently on your part, and there was a break. It's not 
reflected in the transcript of the deposition; is that right? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. You went out in the hall with Mr. Craig Hall. 
A. Yes. 
Q. Craig Hall is the Murray City attorney. | 
A. Yes. 
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Q. Who was representing you. 
A. Yes. 
Q. And in that break you disclosed to Mr. Hall 
that there physically was a report over in your office,, 
didn't you? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And I take it that Mr. Hall then advised you 
to do what you did thereafter, to skate around the report? 
A. That's correct. i 
Q. So other than what you were requested by 
Mr. Tolman to prevent his boss from finding out about this, 
he had at all times encouraged you to tell the truth. 
A. That's correct. 1 
Q. That's all. | 
CROSS-EXAMINATION j 
BY MR. BRASS: 
Q. Let's talk about your investigations,since 
that was one of the things that Mr. Snow talked to you about.! 
You think that Jim Ashby is an expert in this 
area, don't you? 
A. He's good. 
Q. Okay. And you think that you're every bit as 
good as he is; is that right? 
A. That's correct. 
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1 ft So there wasn't any question in your mind that 
2 at least some people in the Salt Lake County Attorney's 
3 Office knew what defendant Tolman's conclusions were? 
4 k That's correct. 
5 ft You didn't feel a need to tell them at that 
6 point in time, did you? 
7 k No. 
8 ft Because you assumed they already knew, based 
9 on what you had heard in conversation? 
10 k That's correct. 
11 ft Now> you have been good friends with defendant 
12 Tolman as of May of 1983 for quite some time. 
13 A. That's correct. 
14 ft You understood he wasn't in love with defendant 
15 Harman? 
16 k I had heard those rumors. 
17 ft Did defendant Tolman ever tell you that? 
18 A. I had heard comments. 
19 ft Comments about his boss? 
20 k Yes. 
21 ft From t h e de fendan t Tolman? 
22 k Yes. 
23 ft In that conversation in May of 1983, I am sorry, 
24 in August of 1983, the telephone conversation you got, is 
25 there any question in your mind defendant Tolman suggested 
L N 
to you that you destroy or get rid of the report? 
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ft Didn't disclose it until Tom Green came out, 
and in that conversation you thought you better tell themx 
about it3 
A. That's correct. 
ft And you understood that if you disclosed the 
report to anyone that had anything to do with the fire, 
defendant Harman would find out about it? 
A. That's correct. 
ft So we weren't just playing, if I may, sir, keep-
away, from defendant Harman here, were we? 
A. No. 
ft Now, the first time you recall a telephone 
conversation with defendant Tolman where he tells you you 
h_ave to do what you have to do, Ralph will take care of ^  
himself, just tell the truth, is after your deposition in 
1984. 
A. That's correct. 
ft And defendant Tolman knew at that point you 
hadn't physically produced a report? 
A. Yes. 
ft But he understood you made some reference to 
it in your deposition. 
A. Yes. 
ft You said you wished you hadn't done that, but 
you had to do what you had to do? 
1001 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
A. 
a 
That's correct. 
And as you testified previously on direct 
yesterday and again on cross today, when you came back from 
your cor 
to say i 
A. 
a 
because 
Lversation with Craig Hall, it wasn't quite accurate 
rou hadn't seen a copy of the report. 
That's correct. 
And that you did that to protect defendant Tolmarj 
you had that conversation with defendant Tolman | 
in August of 1983. 
' i 1 
k 
ft 
remains 
for the 
A. 
ft 
A. 
ft 
i & 
1 ^ 
Yes. 
Then another 13 months goes by and the report 
wherever it was for that — before the deposition | 
next succeeding 13 months. 
That's correct. 
You don't look for it? 
No. 
You don't dig it out or produce it? 
No. 
It's only when your deposition is noticed up | 
again and it becomes an issue that you dig it out and you | 
1 finally 
k 
ft 
of 1985, 
for the 
produce it. 
That's correct. 
Now, with respect to your deposition in December 
where you testified that, I believe under oath 
first time, about this conversation with defendant 
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1 ft Would it be fair to say you were very anxious 
2 to keep from being indicted? 
3 A. Yes. 
4 ft Anxious to please these gentlemen who were the 
5 prosecutors there, perhaps? 
6 A. No, 
7 ft You didnft care if you pleased them or not? 
8 I A. N o . 
9 ft And so any changes in your testimony really 
10 didn't have anything to do with any conversations you had 
It with Mr. Keller and Mr. Snow, did it? 
12 A. No. 
13 ft You were aware that the significance of the 
14 Tolman report was that it merely corroborated the report 
15 that you prepared yourself? 
16 A. That's correct. 
17 ft And it was a second opinion, if you will? 
18 A. Yes. 
* ^. 
19 ft And you also knew that whenever that was litigate 
20 with or without the report, Mr. Tolman was going to come 
21 in and tell the truth, give his opinions? 
22 I A. That's correct. 
23 
24 
25 
true, 
ft 
then, 
destroy" 
And so not 1 
that at the 
are being used 
bo beat a 
time the 
, it was 
dead horse, 1 
se words "get 
but . 
rid 
not to physically 
It's 
of < 
get 
also 
and 
rid/ 
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of that report but to conceal the fact it went to you from 
this man? 
k In my opinion. 
ft And any concealment that you may have engaged 
in, any lies you may have told in depositions thereafter 
were not suggested by Mr. Tolman but were the product of 
your own decision,thinking you were going to protect him. 
A. That's correct. 
Q. You didn't know for a fact that if you told 
10 I someone else it would get to Harman necessarily, did you? 
11 I A. N o . 
12 I MR. DeLAND: T h a t ' s a l l . 
13 
14 RECROSS-EXAMINATION 
15 BY MR. BRASS: 
16 Q. Let's start with the $2 million. You were 
17 telling Mr. Snow and the jury that your recall actually 
18 has improved since your deposition was taken; is that right? 
19 A. That's correct. 
20 Q. So as more time goes by, you're recalling more 
2i details? 
22 A. A few. 
23 Q. Okay. And maybe if we came back in another 
24 year you might recall some^more? 
25 k Possible. 
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LONI F. DeLAND (0862) 
McRAE & DeLAND 
132 South 600 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 364-1333 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant Tolman 
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
v. 
RALPH TOLMAN, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
EX PARTE MOTION FOR 
EXTENSION OF TIME TO 
FILE PETITION FOR WRIT 
OF CERTIORARI 
Supreme Ct. Case No. 
Ct. of Appeals No. 870407-CA 
Defendant, Ralph Tolman, through his counsel, Loni F. 
DeLand, pursuant to Rule 45 of the Rules of the Utah Supreme 
Court, requests that this Court grant a 30 day extension of time 
within which to file his Petition for Writ of Certiorari in the 
above-entitled matter, for the reason that counsel for Defendant 
needs additional time to prepare said Petition due to the exten-
sive record and complex issues. 
The Petition is presently due on June 21, 1989. 
DATED this day of June, 1989. / 
LONI F. DeLAND 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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LONI P. DeLAND (0862) 
McRAE & DeLAND 
132 South 600 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 364-1333 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant Tolman 
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
v. 
RALPH TOLMAN, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
ORDER 
Supreme Ct. Case No. 
Ct. of Appeals No. 870407-CA 
Based upon the foregoing motion, and good cause appear-
ing therefore, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant/Appellant is 
granted a 30 day extension of time within which to file his 
Petition for Writ of Certiorari in the above-entitled matter. 
Said Petition shall be filed on or before July 21, 1989. 
DATED 
UTAH SUPREME COURT 
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LONI P. DeLAND (0862) 
McRAE & DeLAND 
132 South 600 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 364-1333 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant Tolman 
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaint iff/Respondent, 
v. 
RALPH TOLMAN, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
MOTION AND STIPULATION 
FOR EXTENSION OF TIME TO 
FILE PETITION FOR WRIT 
OF CERTIORARI 
Supreme Ct. Case No. 
Ct. of Appeals No. 870407-CA 
Defendant/Appellant, Ralph Tolman, through his counsel, 
Loni F. DeLand, requests that this Court grant a seven (7) day 
extension of time within which to file his Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari, which is presently due on July 21, 1989, for the 
reason that counsel for Defendant has a family emergency and is 
unable to complete said Petition by July 21, 1989. 
DATED this VQ day of July, 1989. 
)NT FNJDeLAND 
Attorney for Defendant7Appellant 
STIPULATION 
I, Dan R. Larsen, attorney for Plaintiff/Respondent, 
hereby agree and stipulate to a seven (7) day extension of time 
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within which Defendant/Appellant may file his Petition for Writ 
of Certiorari. 
DATED this day of July, 1989. 
DAN R. LARSEN 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Respondent 
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LONI F. DeLAND (0862) 
McRAE & DeLAND 
132 South 600 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 364-1333 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant Tolman 
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, ! 
v. 
RALPH TOLMAN, ] 
Defendant/Appellant. 
ORDER 
1 Supreme Ct. Case No. 
Ct. of Appeals No. 870407-CA 
Based upon the foregoing Motion and Stipulation, and 
good cause appearing therefore, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant/Appellant is 
granted a seven (7) day extension of time within which to file 
his Petition for Writ of Certiorari in the above-entitled matter. 
Said Petition shall be filed on or before July 28, 1989. 
DATED this <r ' day of July, 1989. 
UTAH SUPREME COURT 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the ^/) day of July, 1989, a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing was hand-delivered to Dan 
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R. Larsen, Attorney for Plaintiff /Respondent, 236 State Capitol, 
Salt Lake City , Utah 84114. 
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